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Abstract 
The following thesis examines the relationship between migration and informality in Mexico.  
Since the 1980’s migration has become increasingly important to the Mexican economy, as the 
flow of remittances alone add 26 billion dollars per year to the Mexican economy (World Bank 
2006).   Similarly, the informal sector has become more important, as an estimated 62% of 
Mexicans work in the informal sector (Arias et al. 2010).  Despite the prevalence of both little is 
known about their interaction.  This thesis attempts to ameliorate that gap by specifically 
examining migration and the formation of formal versus informal businesses.  The household 
data come from the Mexican Migration Project, while the community level data come from the 
Mexican census.  Multilevel modeling techniques (random effects) were used because of the 
previous literatures suggested influence of community level factors (Lindstrom 1996).  
Additionally, multinomial or multi-risk models were run to see which factors predicted 
involvement in each respective sector.  Community level factors seemed to be more important 
for informal businesses, while previous capital attainment and socio-economic status were more 
important for formal businesses.   The results indicate that through migration Mexico saw a 
proliferation of informality, as households used migration to overcome capital constraints.  In 
addition, this research indicates that migration does not seem to attenuate inequality through 
business formation.  Future research needs to be completed on the influence of these informal 
businesses on broader, community level development. 
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Chapter I 
 Introduction 
In the past two decades migradollars, the transfer of money from foreign workers back to 
their native countries, has evolved into an enormous and crucial flow of capital from the 
developed to the developing world.  The term migradollars includes both remittances, money 
transferred while the migrant is abroad, and savings acquired while abroad and brought back 
home.  In 2001, global remittances totaled 131.5 billion dollars.  By 2006, global remittances had 
increased to 291 billion dollars—a 114% increase over only 5 years (World Bank 2006, 12).  The 
World Bank estimates that in 2006 global remittances reached almost 300 billion dollars, thereby 
becoming the second largest source of funding for the developing world, behind only direct 
foreign investment and ahead of official development aid (World Bank 2006, 13).  The World 
Bank and others now estimate that approximately seventy percent of all migrants send 
remittances home (Massey, Durand and Pren 2010, 23; World Bank 2006).  Additionally, 
savings accumulated by the migrants while abroad then brought back home are substantial.  
Migrants can return with more savings than their remittances totals (Massey and Parrado 1994).  
For the rest of this thesis remittances and any savings brought back by the migrant will be 
combined and referred to as “migradollars.” Migradollars are now one of the fastest growing and 
crucial flows of capital to the developing world (World Bank 2006).   
Although the transmitting of migradollars has escalated dramatically, their macro-
economic effects on economic development are not fully understood, specifically at the 
community level (Binford 2003; Jones 1998).  Results differ with methodologies and migration 
corridor examined (Airola 2007; Binford 2003; Kapur 2004; Massey and Parrado 1994; World 
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Bank 2006; Zachariah, Nair and Rajan 2003).  Some of the literature is optimistic regarding the 
developmental potential of remittances (Massey and Parrado 1994; World Bank 2006), whereas 
other studies assert that remittances can withhold broader community level development  (Kapur 
2004, 23; Reichert 1981).   Few communities dependent on migration and remittances have 
demonstrated substantial economic growth. When communities become inundated with outside 
capital and do not demonstrate economic growth, there must be something withholding the 
growth.  Perhaps the current modeling is inadequate and requires a new perspective to 
completely understand the influence of migradollars on a community’s economy. 
One of the potential factors that could be inhibiting economic development in these 
migration-dependent communities is how migration and migradollars may propagate large 
prevalent informal economies.  Informal economic activities are simply any economic activity 
that occurs without licensing, or economic activities that occur beyond regulation (Fernandez 
Kelly 2006; Tokeman 1992).  Migradollars may facilitate informal economies in two ways:  first 
through spending patterns as when the migradollars are overwhelmingly spent on immediate 
consumption, and second, and more importantly for the context of this research, through the 
creation of small scale, informal businesses (Massey and Parrado 1998).  Some have argued that 
informal economies inhibit economic development--an argument to be presented in more depth 
below (De Soto 2002).  
The migration corridor between the United States and Latin America provides an 
extraordinary opportunity to study the relationship between migration and informality.  The 
United States and Mexico share the longest contiguous border between a “First World” or a 
developed country and a “Third World” or a developing country (Doty 2009, 345).  The physical 
proximity as well as the prevalence of economic opportunity makes the United States desirable 
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for Mexican migrants.  Current estimates assert that there are more than eleven million Mexican 
migrants in the United States, 76% percent of whom send remittances back to Mexico (Massey, 
Durand and Pren 2010, 25).  In addition, after oil and manufacturing, remittances are the third 
greatest single source of income for the Mexican economy.  In 2006 remittances to Mexico 
totaled over 26 billion dollars.  However, the true influence of remittances on development in 
Mexico is often debated (World Bank 2006).  In addition to being highly dependent on 
remittances, Mexico has a well-documented informal sector.  In 2009 it was estimated that sixty 
two percent of all Mexican workers did not contribute to social security (an often used indicator 
of informal labor) (Arias et al. 2010, 36).  The combination of high rates of migration, 
informality, and data regarding both make Mexico an ideal location to analyze the relationship 
between migration and informality.  
This thesis will focus exclusively on urban areas in Mexico.  The scope of this analysis 
will be limited to urban Mexico for three reasons.  First according to Massey and Parrado (1994), 
the largest flows of migradollars were to urban areas where the subsequent multiplier effects 
were greatest.  These multiplier effects had the utmost impact on businesses according to Massey 
and Parrado (1994), who conclude that migradollars were most often spent in the commercial 
sector in urban areas.  The widely documented spending patterns suggest that migradollars would 
further increase demand for businesses.  However, it is unclear who is meeting this demand for 
these new markets.  Could it be non-migrant households or return migrants?  Is the demand met 
by formal or informal businesses?  The second reason for examining only urban areas is that the 
businesses opened in rural areas are overwhelmingly informal.  Rural areas have much less 
regulation and the regulation is much less likely to be enforced than urban areas (Arias et al. 
2010).  There may also be less demand as well as less room for new businesses in rural areas 
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than urban ones. Future research could examine how migradollars are often used to accelerate 
agriculture as is often asserted by the New Economics of Labor Migration.   Finally, Mexico 
experienced a tremendous growth of urban informality during the 1980s through the 1990s 
(Arias et al. 2010; Davis 2007). Although the causal factors of this growth have been widely 
examined (and discussed below), there has been little research regarding how migration and 
migradollars may have accelerated the growth of informality in these urban areas.   
In addition to a better understanding of migration and informality, this thesis will attempt 
to develop a working understanding of the relationship between migration and business 
formation in general.  In the developing world, businesses tend to develop at the household and 
community level (Sage 1989).   Businesses can additionally create economic independence and 
mitigate future reliance on migration.  Although migration and business formation in Mexico has 
been examined before (Massey and Parrado 1998), an additional aim of this thesis is to gain a 
better understanding of the relationship between migration and business formation specifically in 
urban Mexico.   Tremendous potential exists between migration and development, and this thesis 
will attempt to examine how it can better be maximized. 
The thesis will be organized as follows.  In the second chapter, I will explore the 
relationship between the use of migradollars and economic development specifically in Mexico.   
Additionally, I will discuss the previous research conducted on the relationship between 
migradollars and return migration on business formation around the globe and again specifically 
in Mexico.  Chapter Three will provide the theoretical framework for the analysis.  First, I will 
discuss the theories of migration and how they can be related to business formation.  Then I will 
discuss the theoretical perspectives on informality and how informality relates to the broader 
concept of development.  The Fourth chapter will describe the data and methods for analysis: 
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event history analysis and multilevel modeling and multinomial modeling techniques. The Fifth 
chapter will present the results of the analysis.  Chapter Six will discuss the implications of the 
results and provide a discussion of the entire thesis.  
Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of the relationship 
between informality and migration in Mexico.  More specifically, this thesis will analyze which 
variables predict the creation of an informal business compared to a formal one.  As asserted by ( 
Lindstrom 2003), statistical analysis of migration must include multiple levels of analysis.  This 
analysis will thus include three levels: household head, household level, and finally, community 
level data.    Below I will list the seven main research objectives that I will attempt to accomplish 
in my thesis. 
1. Examine the relationship of the household head’s migratory experience and the creation 
of businesses.  Does migratory experience matter?  Does current migration predict 
business formation or does previous migratory experience? 
2. Explore the impact of other aspects of the household, including educational attainment, 
the influence of children, and how the stage of life cycle matters in terms of business 
formation.  
3. Explore contextual, community level variables and how they are related to business 
formation--specifically the prevalence of migration in the community.  Are communities 
with more migrants more predisposed to business formation?  How do the multiplier 
effects associated with migration influence businesses?  How do other community level 
factors, such as community wide informal and formal economies matter for informal and 
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formal business creation, respectively.   In other words, I am going to examine how 
migrants form informal versus formal businesses and how they vary across places, 
according to community characteristics.  For emphasis, my thesis will examine how place 
matters in differentiating formal versus informal businesses. 
4. Through competing risk models, analyze which household and community level-factors 
predict involvement in the formal versus informal sector. 
5. Improve on past modeling of business formation (Massey and Parrado 1998) by using 
multilevel modeling techniques. 
6. Gain a better of informality, a topic most often examined through qualitative techniques 
through quantitative modeling. 
7. Through a cross-level interaction term, examine the influence of a household-level 
migratory experience on an established community-level formal economy. 
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Chapter II 
 Migradollars and Development 
 A major debate for those who study international migration is the economic 
developmental implications of migradollars.  The absolute size of the flow of migradollars from 
the developed to developing world is astounding, reaching over 300 billion dollars in 2010.  
However, because migradollars are overwhelmingly spent on immediate consumption rather than 
invested their developmental, potential is partially abated.  There are two major ideologies on the 
relationship between migradollars and development.  One that asserts that migradollar flows lead 
to economic stagnation and dependency, or the so called “migrant syndrome” (Kapur 2004; 
Reichart 1989), whereas the other suggests that migradollars often spur development through to a 
lesser extent, direct usage as well as indirect or multiplier effects (Durand, Parrado and Massey 
1996).  Most agree that when migradollars are used productively, for example to start a business, 
they have greater developmental potential for both the household and community (Durand, 
Parrado and Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado 1994; World Bank 2006; Zachariah 2001).   
This chapter will be broken up into four sections.  First I will provide a general overview 
of migradollars to Mexico.  Second I will discuss the contemporary migradollars usage patterns 
in Mexico and the debate regarding their developmental implications.  Third, I will discuss the 
global relationship between return migration and business formation.   The final section will 
discuss the previous research conducted specifically in Mexico regarding return migration and 
business formation.  
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Migradollars to Mexico: 
In 2006, the flow of remittances to Mexico was estimated at 26 billion dollars.  Following 
the export of oil and manufacturing, migradollars are the third greatest source of income in the 
Mexican economy.  The total of 26 billion dollars makes Mexico the third largest recipient of 
migradollars behind only India and China (World Bank 2006).  However, since the global 
recession, remittances have declined along with migration in general (Rendall, Brownell and 
Kups 2010).  Despite their decline, remittances make up roughly 2% of Mexico’s GDP (World 
Bank 2006).  
 Since Mexico entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement, the country has 
experienced stable economic growth.  Before the creation of NAFTA, Mexico’s GDP was 
growing at about 2% per year; after NAFTA the growth of the GDP increased to roughly 4% a 
year (World Bank, 2006).  Over this time period remittances have increased at an even greater 
level, more than 10% annually (Coronado, 2004).  One of the greatest causes of the increase in 
migradollars was the increase in monetary transfer companies.  In 1995, there were five money 
transfer companies in the United States and Mexico (Coronado 2004).  By 2007, there were more 
than one hundred (Coronado, 2004).  The proliferation of money transfer companies has caused 
transaction costs to decrease by more than 50% since 2000 (Coronado 2004).  Through 
competition and advertising, corporations have become a major factor in the burgeoning growth 
of remittances.  Although migration may be more difficult than in the past, it is now easier and 
cheaper to send money than ever (Coronado 2004, Western Union 2011).   
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The Implications of Migradollar Usage 
Once migradollars get back to Mexico, they are not typically invested, saved, or spent on 
ways that decrease future dependence on migration or migradollars.  Rather, migradollars are 
spent overwhelmingly on “family maintenance” (immediate consumables, such as living 
expenses, food, clothes, utilities and basic bills) or “superfluously” (Massey and Parrado 1994), 
such as on a party.  In addition remittances are often spent on housing, overwhelmingly on 
adding a room to the house.  This trend of remittance spending can often lead to household and 
community level dependence and has therefore become known as “migrant syndrome” (Kapur 
2004, Portes 2007).  Migrant syndrome may be too harsh a term because it suggests that those 
receiving the migradollars may not be spending the money wisely and that it is a disease that 
hurts the household and community.  However, people who receive migradollars are making 
rational decisions.  It would be ridiculous to criticize the spending patterns of a mother raising a 
family and living off of migradollars sent home from the father or the children.  It would be 
illogical for a household to invest in the community’s economy before fulfilling its own needs.  
The purpose of this section is not to attack spending patterns but rather to attempt to explain why 
economic development is not occurring on a broader scale.  In summary, the literature regarding 
remittance spending is overwhelmingly congruent: migradollars are not usually spent in a 
manner that could lead to economic growth or mitigate future dependence on migration. 
 Most of the money from migradollars is not spent on “any productive asset that would 
generate a source of income that could eventually replace migration” (Roberts 1997; 267).  
Instead, remitted finances are spent on simply living, housing, housing maintenance, other 
consumer goods, or even parties (Roberts 1997).  In rural Mexico, Roberts (1997) estimates that 
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only 5% of migradollars were used to increase the migrant’s agricultural property value (Roberts, 
1997). 
 A study of the town of Huercio, Mexico, found that almost 67% of migradollars were 
spent on living expenses or housing (Taylor et al. 1996).  The Bank of Mexico asserts this may 
be an underestimate.  In a 2006 report concerning remittance expenditures, the author suggests 
that on average, 86.4% of migradollars was spent on sustaining family life or housing 
maintenance (Bank of Mexico, 2006).  The author did, however, assert that 6.3% of migradollars 
are spent on household education (Bank of Mexico 2006).  Increasingly migradollars are 
invested in human capital.  However, this human capital does not always end dependence on 
migration.  According to Durand, Parrado and Massey (1996), migradollars are increasingly 
spent on English education for assumed future migration. 
In a nation-wide study of Mexican remittance spending, Airola (2007) reached similar 
conclusions.  He found that migradollars were being spent even more on living expenses than in 
the past (Airola, 2007).  Surprisingly, he also found that migradollars are increasingly likely to 
be spent on medical supplies.  This may indicate that migration may be spurred by household 
economic burdens, such as emergency surgery or a leak in the roof (Airola, 2007), as well as by 
a search for a job and general life improvement.  His results correspond with much of the other 
literature regarding migradollars: more likely than not, migradollars are not invested; rather, they 
are spent quickly on the basic necessities.  But also that migradollars are used more productively 
in times of necessity. 
In perhaps the most representative sample of Mexican migrants, Massey and Parrado 
(1994; 24) found results that were congruent with the research mentioned above.  They 
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concluded that on average 65.3% of migradollars were spent mostly to support a family (Massey 
and Parrado, 1994, 24).  They also claimed that 14.2% of migradollars were spent in other ways 
(for example, to pay off debt, buy cars, or for another reason) (Massey and Parrado, 1994).  Their 
research asserts that almost 80% of migradollars were spent on consumption while only 6.5% 
were spent on “productive” activities (Massey and Parrado, 1994; 24).  Of the productive 
investment, only 4.2% was spent on the formation of business.  Their research did, however, find 
that when migradollars were saved, they were much more likely to be spent on “productive” 
activities and investments.  However, just 1.6% of migradollars are saved (Massey and Parrado, 
1994; 24).  These savings have more profound effect on business formation and return migration.  
Similar to the savings from remittances, the authors found that the lump sum of money 
accumulated while abroad then brought back are more likely to be used productively.  Massey 
and Parrado conclude that 17% of savings were spent in a productive manner, however only 21% 
of all migradollars are savings, whereas 79% are remittances (Massey and Parrado 1994; 24). 
While the ability to accumulate savings is often crucial to the formation of a business, 
like remittances, not all savings are used productively.  Upon return to India, migrants from the 
Gulf come back with substantial relative wealth (Zachariah et al. 2001).  The acquired wealth 
allows them to live comfortably for years (without another job).  However, other remittance-
dependent communities across the globe, the acquired wealth has not led to community-wide 
development.  Zachariah et al. explain: “almost all their foreign savings have been used up for 
subsistence, buying land, constructing houses, paying dowries, paying back debt etc…What little 
was left was invested in self-employment projects which in practice yielded little in terms of 
income” (Zachariah et al. 2001; 6).  The unproductive spending by the return migrants may 
indicate that Indian migrants face the “migrant syndrome” also seen in Mexico (Jones, 1998; 11).    
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In India, few return migrants use the savings accumulated to start retail establishments 
(Zachariah et al. 2001).   However, in Mexico, savings have been demonstrated to be used more 
productively (Massey and Parrado 1994). 
Compounding the problem, research has also demonstrated that migradollars are more 
likely to be spent on international imports rather than domestically-produced goods (Puri and 
Shivani, 1999).  This study is dated and may need replication specifically in Mexico.  The 
demand for foreign goods could be a result of an international lifestyle.  American amenities 
become necessities for the returning migrants. 
Migradollar (specifically remittances) spending also affects household labor output.  
Mexican households that are dependent on migradollars are less likely to see full employment 
output  (Airola, 2007).  When a family member is working abroad, the rest of the family is not as 
likely to work compared to a family that receives no migradollars (Airola, 2007).  This is 
especially true when the household head is male and is working abroad (Airola, 2007).  The 
other family members could be working to raise the household’s total income, but they do not 
because they can simply live off of the migradollars.  The high wages earned abroad and sent 
back provide little incentive to work.  This can constrain an entire community’s labor pool.  
Communities most heavily dependent on migradollars are less able to create other sources of 
capital because of the inactivity of the workforce (Kapur 2004).  
The International Labor Organization (ILO) suggests that remittance flows are 
“deceptive” and can lead to the perpetuation of migration of the working-age population (Puri 
and Shivani, 1999; 8).  They conclude that the consistent migration flow of the working age 
population discourages investment because workers are thought of as “unreliable” (Puri and 
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Shivani, 1999; 9).  The wages earned abroad can raise the relative wages at home, which can 
further discourage investment.  The World Bank concurred and concluded that “the data on 
income differences may influence expectations of future earnings by migrants and their children 
which would undoubtedly generate much larger migration” (World Bank, 2006; 59).  This 
suggests that remittances not only could immediately discourage investment, but they could 
discourage investment for generations.  Even with the relaxed trade tariffs of NAFTA, why set 
up a factory when the workers could earn higher wages abroad?  The migrant networks are 
usually more socially engrained than a new localized job opportunity, which may provide lower 
wages than work abroad.  
The studies on remittance usage overwhelmingly indicate that migradollars are not spent 
productively, at least in terms of broader economic development.  Instead of being spent on 
assets that could lessen the household’s dependence on migradollars, they are spent on consumer 
goods and household maintenance, and they perhaps have the unwanted side effect of 
discouraging the family from seeking employment.  Devish Kapur, a researcher from the 
Harvard Center for Global Development, described the consequences of unproductive spending 
of migradollars.  He explained that migradollars have been transformed from a “consequence of 
migration” into “the principle driver” (Kapur, 2004; 13).  Local economies are not being 
diversified; instead, they are becoming reliant on migradollars as the exclusive source of capital.  
Kapur argued further that migradollars increase material wealth, while “undermining their (the 
migrants’) long term future” (Kapur, 2004; 13).  When migradollars are not spent productively, a 
culture emerges that is dependent on migration, a “culture of dependency” (Kapur, 2004; 13) 
which is similar to the “migrant syndrome” discussed two decades before.  Cultures of 
dependency and the migrant syndrome illustrate the same phenomenon.    If migradollars are to 
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be turned into productive long-term economic gains, the funds should be invested in diversified 
infrastructure that will promote economic independence and end, or at least mitigate, migration.  
Although migradollars are overwhelmingly spent on consumption and may discourage 
investment, they also attenuate poverty levels (Acosta et al. 2007). While the impoverished may 
not be able to find work at home, they are able to find work abroad.  The higher wages earned 
abroad facilitate remittance transfers back home.  Similarly, remittances undoubtedly abate 
poverty in economically poorer areas by raising the per-capita income in receiving areas (Acosta 
et al. 2007).  Households that receive remittances are boosted out of poverty into the lower 
middle class.  In Mexico, the poorer states demonstrate a greater per capita increase in income 
due to remittances than the other states (Taylor et al. 2005).  Not all the impoverished are able to 
migrate; however, the families that do receive remittances see their income increase dramatically 
(World Bank 2006).  In Mexico the migrants who see the greatest benefits are the unskilled who 
are largely the uneducated and impoverished.  However, the first people to migrate out of the 
communities may be the middle class (Acosta et al. 2007), a phenomenon which is discussed 
below.  Unskilled labor in America pays much more than it does in Mexico—a difference that 
helps lift a family out of poverty (World Bank, 2006).  Even if migration may lead to 
dependency, it provides an opportunity to raise households and communities out of poverty. 
 As previous research suggests, remittances are overwhelmingly spent on consumption.  
However, not all research indicates that these spending patterns lead to the detrimental “migrant 
syndrome” or formation of “communities of dependency.”  Rather Durand, Parrado and Massey 
(1996) stress the power of economic multiplier effects from migradollars.  They suggest that 
even the overwhelming pattern of consumption is beneficial for both the community and national 
economy.  For example, they discuss how even when migradollars are spent on beer (a 
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supposedly non-productive investment), manufacturing jobs are created as the demand for beer 
increases.  Massey and Parrado similarly suggest the power of the economic multiplier effect 
(1994; 25).  If estimates have stayed consistent over time with Massey and Parrado’s 1994 
estimates, it can be estimated that an additional 16.97 million (26*.653) dollars worth of demand 
was created through the multiplier effect of remittances.  More specifically, for the context of 
this research, Massey and Parrado suggest that the multiplier effects are the greatest in urban 
areas, especially in the commercial sector.  Additionally, Durand, Parrado and Massey (1996; 
430) found that migrants from urban areas also remit more than their rural counterparts.  This 
could indicate that urban areas are especially healthy for business formation, especially the cities 
with high concentrations of migrants (Riosmena 2009). 
 Durand, Parrado and Massey (1996) claim that the economic multiplier effects of 
migradollars are not captured by just the sum of their total.  They assert: “The multiplicative 
effect can only occur if some of the funds are channeled into income-producing activities that 
raise total income above the amount of the original transfer” (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 
1996; 440).  Specifically, they discuss how international migradollars were combined with 
internal migration to create light manufacturing in Western Mexico (Durand, Parrado and 
Massey 1996).  Additionally, to illustrate how migradollars can act as a multiplier that can create 
businesses, they discuss how during the winter when the migrants are home, many businesses are 
formed to meet the increased demand (and increased dollars brought into the economy).  The 
migrants feel more obligated to spend their wages to demonstrate their status and support the 
local economy.  They conclude that migradollars being spent overwhelmingly on consumption 
does not lead to migrant syndrome but rather that consumption (and the associated multiplier 
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effects) can be a “powerful catalyst to economic development” (Durand, Parrado and Massey 
1996; 441). 
 In summary, the only widely agreed upon aspect of migradollar consumption patterns is 
that they are overwhelmingly spent on consumption.  Some say that consumption only breeds 
dependency, whereas others argue that through multiplier effects, migradollars can facilitate 
economic development.  The results most likely vary from household to household and 
community to community, place matters.  Another widely agreed upon aspect of remittances and 
development is that when migradollars are used in a more productive manner, such as starting a 
business, broader development can be achieved and future dependence on migration can be 
mitigated (Sage 1987, Massey and Parrado 1994).  The following section will discuss the 
previous research completed regarding the relationship between migration and business 
formation. 
Return Migration and Business Formation 
Increased levels of global migration come with an increase in return emigration to the 
country of origin (Weeks 2008).  The vast majority of Mexican-US migration is not permanent 
but rather temporary, as many migrants return to their communities of origin (Massey, Alarcon, 
Durand and Gonzalez 1987).  Similar to migradollars, the developmental implications of return 
emigration vary with the methodology employed and the region studied.  More simply, there is 
no conclusive relationship between return migration and economic development.  Even within 
regions and migration corridors, the implications of return migration on development can vary 
dramatically (Gubert and Christophe 2008).  Despite the lack of empirical evidence, many 
believe that return migration has incredible potential for development.  This potential spurred by 
return migration is believed to be so high due to the capital gained by the migrant while abroad.  
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However, capital transfers and accumulation are not the only means that development can be 
spurred; return migrants can also start businesses. 
The return migrant not only brings economic capital that would enable business 
formation, they also may have gained human and social capital during migration which could 
facilitate the creation and maintenance of a business (Gubert and Christophe 2008, Stark and 
Bloom 1985).  Aside from remittances, migrants often return to their origin communities with 
substantial savings accumulated abroad.   The subsequent section will introduce the literature 
regarding the developmental potential of return emigration, specifically their formation of 
businesses at the global level, then discuss return migration in Mexico before finally discussing 
the implications of return migration on business formation in Mexico.  
The economic potential of return migrants to the developing world is enormous.  
Numerous countries on different continents have implemented programs that attempt to harness 
the potential of return migration on development, specifically through business creation.  For 
example, to take advantage of this capital, the Chinese government has created programs that 
facilitate return migrant business creation to ameliorate the economic dichotomy between the 
industrialized and urban East and the rural West (Murphy 2000).  According to Massey and 
Parrado (1994), returning migrants’ savings are more likely to be used in a more “productive 
manner” than remittances transferred while the migrants were abroad.  In addition to the 
economic capital, migrants also return with considerable human capital gained while abroad.  
This includes but is not limited to work training and experience, managerial training, increased 
confidence in the financial system and education.  These transfers of economic and human 
capital are not limited to South-North migration, but have also been documented in South-South 
migration (Diatta and Mbox 2002).  More importantly for the context of this research, return 
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migration can facilitate the creation of businesses by return migrants. Obviously, these new 
businesses have the potential to ameliorate future migration dependence and foster economic 
independence at both household and community levels.  
 
Global Return Migration and Business Formation Trends 
In general, households with migration experience are more likely to start businesses than 
non-migrant households.  This trend is apparent regardless of continent or migration corridor.  
For example, Dustman and Kirchamp (2001) find that 50% of all Turkish migrants that return 
from Germany start a business within four years of their return.  Researchers are unsure if 
migrants are more entrepreneurial to begin with or if the migration experience actually facilitates 
business creation (McFalls 2007).  However, globally, specific trends have emerged that predict 
the business formation by international return migrants.  The first and seemingly most important 
predictor of business formation is migration duration (Gubert and Christophe 2008; Ilahi 1999; 
Lindstrom 1996).  The longer the migration, the more likely return emigrants are to form a 
business upon their return.  The trend of increased migration duration leading to business 
formation has a few explanations.  The first and most apparent in the literature is that longer 
migration durations facilitate a greater amount of savings; these accumulated savings can then be 
invested in a business.  The second is that migrants gain human capital while abroad through 
education or specific skill training, then upon their return they can use their increased human 
capital to start a business.  More simply, longer durations may lead to greater human and 
economic capital accumulation by the migrant.  In addition, longer durations leading to increased 
savings, Galor and Stark (1990) demonstrate the migrants who have a higher probability of 
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return save more than their native counterparts or migrants who permanently reside in the 
destination.  These additional savings can then be invested in a business upon return.  
  In Ghana, the relationship between migration duration and business formation is 
prevalent. However, unlike elsewhere, the migrants would fund and form businesses while 
abroad through remittances then come back once the business was stable and needed 
management (Black, King and Tiemoko 2003).  For return emigrants to Pakistan, the trend is 
similar as Ilahi (1999; 1) asserts: “Accumulated savings are a critical determinant of non-farm 
self-employment.”  An increased duration of migration for the Pakistanis facilitates increased 
savings.   In Tunisia and Algeria return migrants from France come home back with savings and 
start businesses.  When asked what the largest barrier to entry was to starting a business, the 
majority of return migrants cited “capital constraints” (Gubert and Christophe 2008).  For them, 
migration and savings accumulated during migration are a means of overcoming capital 
constraints that would have prevented the formation of a business without migration (congruent 
with the New Economics of Labor Migration discussed below (NELM).  
 The importance of savings accumulated while abroad is further apparent in the 
difference in business formation between internal and international migrants.  International 
migrants are often able to accumulate larger sums of money during their migrations, making 
them more likely to start a business (Ilahi 1999).  In multiple migration corridors on multiple 
continents, migration duration is not as important for internal migrants as for international 
migrants (Lindstrom and Lauster 2001, Ilahi 1999, Zachariah et al. 2001).  Through the savings 
acquired during migration, the return migrants are able to overcome “local market failures,” 
which is congruent with the theory of NELM discussed below.   The ability to accumulate 
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savings during migration is a crucial factor in business formation across the globe, and especially 
in Mexico.   
In addition to migration duration, a major global predictor of business formation is the 
type of work done while abroad.  Intuitively, managerial experience gained abroad is strongly 
associated with the formation of a business upon return.  When the migrants work as managers 
they are able to gain the human capital and experience to run a business upon their return.  
Conversely, skilled workers or waged workers are much less likely to begin a business upon their 
return; rather, they are more likely to do similar jobs in the origin as they did in the destination.  
In Pakistan Ilhai (1999), argues that skilled workers do not start businesses because they get paid 
more, with less risk and more familiarity with their work.  In Ghana the division between 
management and skilled labor while abroad continues upon return.  Similarly, some of the most 
successful factories in rural China were started by return migrants with management experience 
gained during migration in the urban East (Murphy 2000).  The inability for occupational change 
after return emigration is a challenge in India, where skilled laborers return home to find no work 
at their skill level.  Instead, they are forced to work under their skill-level and the salary they 
earned while abroad (Zachariah et al. 2001).   Little research has been completed regarding 
occupational trajectories for Mexican migrants to the United States. 
Migration does not fundamentally alter someone’s occupational choice; rather, return 
migrants do similar work at home as they did abroad.  Additionally, managerial experience may 
be interrelated to savings accumulated abroad, as managers often get paid more than waged 
workers.  It is unknown if migrants are more entrepreneurial than the general population, as most 
of the research regarding return migration and business formation only studies migrants, not the 
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entire population.  However, the analysis below includes the entire population to see the 
difference between migrants and the outstanding population. 
Another major predictor across the globe of business formation by return migrants is the 
economic conditions of the community of origin.  As discussed in Lindstrom (1996) 
communities in Mexico that are economically dynamic see more investment from migration, 
while communities that are economically stagnant see less investment in the creation of 
businesses (the influence of community-level variables will be discussed in depth below).  In 
Pakistan, migrants from rural areas are not likely to form businesses, while migrants from urban 
areas (with thriving markets and demand), have an increased probability of business formation.  
Furthermore, savings have no influence on rural workers in Pakistan wanting to start a farm.  On 
a global scale, most of the businesses created by return migrants are in economically dynamic 
urban areas.  The migrants are acting rationally, as they see greater potential for investment in 
economically dynamic communities and invest their accumulated savings in these businesses.  In 
summary, capital accumulation while abroad, work experience, and migration duration have all 
been documented to be associated with business by return migrants. 
 
Return Migration and Business Formation in Mexico 
 Congruent with global trends, migration from Mexico is often temporary, often 
fluctuating by season.  In fact, most migrants are seasonal and/or temporary (Durand, Massey 
and Zenteno 2001).  Often the migrants return during the winter or for their community’s 
religious holidays (Rendall, Brownell and Kups 2010).  Most migrants return within a year 
(Reyes 2001).  Although return migration is common, the longer a migrant stays in the United 
States the lower the probability of return to Mexico (Ruiz-Tagle and Wong 2009).  Like 
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migration, return migration and relocation follows a cost-benefit model (Borjas 1999).  The 
substantial return migration by hundreds of thousands of individuals to Mexico every year allows 
for the potential for development and business formation.  As with global return migration 
trends, return migrants to Mexico often bring with them substantial accumulated human and 
social capital.   
 Upon return, it can often to be difficult to get a job, as social capital and connections may 
have been lost during the migration.  Glitter, Glitter, and Southgate (2008) assert that return 
migrants often have lost these connections during their migration and have less human capital 
than non-migrants from the same community.  They conclude that return migrants often have a 
more difficult time finding a job than non-migrants.  Not being able to find a job may force them 
into the informal sector, engage in future migrations, or to start a business.  Although, unlike the 
alternatives, migrants who start a business may have been determined to start a business before 
their return and even before their migration. 
As with global trends, in Mexico, an increased duration of migration has also been 
documented to predict the formation of a business.  Lindstrom (1996) found that migrants from 
more “economically dynamic” communities were more likely to have emigrated for longer.  He 
attributes the increased savings to the longer duration of migration, which then could be invested 
in the economically dynamic communities, most likely in a business.  Conversely, migrants from 
less dynamic communities stayed for shorter periods, albeit more frequently. In addition to the 
association between longer migration durations and business formations is the fact that return 
emigrants who start a business are much less likely to migrate again after the formation of a 
business.  However, future research needs to examine if migration can occur with the specific 
objective to save a fledgling business.  Contrary to those who form businesses, return migrants 
 
 
23 
 
who do not start a business are more likely to migrate again (Lindstrom 1996).  Repeat migration 
demonstrates that the migrants may have different motivations before they even migrate.  Those 
who stay for longer durations want to save for an investment, whereas the migrants who stay for 
shorter are continually dependent on migration as a source of income rather than being 
concerned with starting a business upon their return.  Future data should ask migrants their 
motivation before migration to see how many specifically want to start a business.  In summary, 
length of migration is an important predictor of business formation due to the amount of savings 
acquired during the migration.  Portes and Bach (1985) maintain that a major determinant of time 
spent abroad is a specific “target” savings amount.  Once this target savings is reached the 
migrants return home.  These migrants may have the objective of business formation: when they 
save enough to start a business then they can return.  The notion of a target savings amount is 
congruent with the longer migration durations of migrants from more economically dynamic 
communities (Lindstrom 1996).  Furthermore, Massey and Parrado (1998; 24) claim that the 
most important factor for business formation is the “quantity of migradollars at their disposal and 
the extent of their migratory experience.” 
 In one of the most comprehensive reviews of the relationship between migration and 
business formation in Mexico, Massey and Parrado (1998) conclude there is a positive 
association between migration and business formation as well as migradollars and business 
formation.  They discuss how migrants use their accumulated capital from their migration to 
form businesses.  Additionally, they discuss how the house can be used as a base for business 
operation, so migradollars spent on housing are not necessarily unproductive (Massey and 
Parrado 1998; 9).  They also found that married household heads are more likely to start 
businesses than single men.  Congruent with Lindstrom (1996), the authors find that the 
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economic conditions of the community of origin clearly matter for business formation.  They 
find a strong positive association between communities where more businesses are being formed 
and business formation as well as the community level of minimum wage earners.  Similarly, 
Durand, Parrado, and Massey (1996) suggest that the productive use of remittances is determined 
by “access to productive resources.”   Massey and Parrado (1998; 11) also found that national 
economic conditions matter.  For example, Massey and Parrado found that when inflation and 
interest rates increase so do the odds of business formation.  They assert that during years of 
hyperinflation households are “forced into entrepreneurial activities in order to bolster sagging 
family incomes” (Massey and Parrado 1998; 11).  However, they do not examine whether these 
businesses which resulted from the years of hyperinflation were formed in the formal or informal 
sector. 
Massey and Parrado find that households currently engaged in migration were less likely 
to form business when the head was engaged in migration.  However, over time the 
accumulation of migradollars increases the odds of business formation.  Communities with larger 
flows of remittances see greater probability of business formation.  This means that even those 
who do not engage in migration in the communities can benefit from migration as the inflow of 
migradollars can allow for more business formation.  To further illustrate the strong relationship 
between migration and business formation, Massey and Parrado (1998; 12) state “on average 21 
percent of businesses in our sample were capitalized with US earnings.”  They also assert that 
“the strongest effect influencing this propensity (of business formation with US earnings) is 
migrant status itself: among household heads who initiated a business those working in the US 
were most likely to finance it with US earnings” (Massey and Parrado 1998; 12).  This seems 
like common sense--the people who start businesses with US dollars are former migrants.  
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Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) come to similar conclusions, suggesting that remittances provide 
the capital to start roughly one in five businesses in Mexico.  The research in general suggests 
that there is a substantial relationship between migration and business formation at both the 
global level and in the United States-Mexico corridor.   In summary, the previous literature 
asserts that migrants are more inclined to start a business upon their return.  However, it remains 
unclear if they are starting formal or informal businesses.   
 
The Influence of the Community of Origin on Migradollar Usage and Business Formation 
One of the most influential predictors of business formation has nothing to do with any 
household level characteristics but rather with the economic conditions of the community in 
which they live.  Migrants from economically prosperous communities are more likely to start a 
business than migrants from poorer communities.   
Communities with more vibrant economies often see more productive usage of 
migradollars as the returning migrants seek successful investments.  Lindstrom (1996) examined 
this relationship when he included community level variables to predict the migration duration of 
international migrants.  In his study he assumed that longer migration durations are associated 
with more productive usage of migradollars.  Lindstrom found that communities that were more 
economically vibrant (quantified by female labor force participation), saw greater migration 
durations, and thus, more productive usage of migradollars.  However, Lindstrom just had proxy 
measurements for productive use of migradollars (U.S. migration duration).  Below I will look at 
business formed, a widely considered “productive use” (Lindstrom 1996, Massey and Parrado 
1994). 
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Congruent with Lidnstrom, in his book on rural development in Mexico, Grindle (1988; 
90-92), describes how economic opportunities influence the use of migradollars.  Tepozteca, a 
small village outside of Mexico City, had little economic potential and most of the citizens were 
pessimistic toward the future economic prospects of their own town.  In Tepozteca, the 
remittances are overwhelmingly used for either construction or subsistence.  Moreover, 
Teposteca dramatically lacked infrastructure, which further attenuated the developmental 
potential (94).  Grindle discusses how the roads are shoddy at best, and their poor condition 
impedes the economic potential of the agricultural sector by limiting export capacity.  In 
Tepozteca, remittances were used only to live rather than be invested in enterprises or the 
community.  Conversely, Union de San Antonio, a prosperous town because of a dairy industry, 
has seen more productive use of remittances (Grindle 1988, 112).  In San Antonio, remittances 
have been used to further augment the strong economy.  For example, they are often used to 
build factories specifically geared to profit off of the strong dairy industry, for example, cheese 
factories (Grindle 1988, 113).  Additionally, in Union de San Antonio, the community has 
pooled saved remittances for infrastructural projects, despite the fact that their economy was 
booming, and not limited by a lack of infrastructure like Tepozatca (Grindle 1988, 114).   
In this way, poorer communities like Tepozatca become increasingly dependent on 
migradollars.  This increased dependence is known as the economic phenomenon of Dutch 
disease.  Dutch disease explains how resources are increasingly diverted exclusively towards one 
resource, in this case labor and migration.  Jaffee (2007) illustrates the process of Dutch disease 
and migration in Southern Mexico.  After a few bad harvests, communities in Southern Mexico 
that were once dependent on coffee exportation slowly grew more and more dependent on the 
higher wage potential of migration and the subsequent remittances (Jaffee 2007).  Over time, 
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there was no labor left to work in the coffee fields, as virtually all the resources had been 
diverted toward migration.  Massey and Parrado (1994)  further illustrate Dutch disease as they 
discuss how numerous communities in Mexico have evolved to become completely dependent 
on remittances as a source of external capital.  In these communities, migradollars are hardly 
invested productively; rather they are spent on consumables used for basic staples.  A feedback 
loop of dependence on migration is thus created as the communities become more and more 
dependent on migration and migradollars.  However, these communities inundated with 
remittances should also see economic multiplier effects as discussed in Massey and Parrado 
(1994).  The substantial relative flow of remittances should increase the demand for both 
consumer goods and construction.  If Massey and Parrado 1994 are correct, the increased capital 
flowing in as remittances should lead to some business creation even in the poorest most 
migration dependent communities.   However, it is unclear if this demand is met by businesses 
started by return-migrants or if these businesses are located in the formal or informal sector.  
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Chapter III 
 Theoretical Perspectives of Migration and Business Formation 
 The formation of businesses by return migrants is congruent with some of the most 
prominent theoretical perspectives on migration.  However, this section will only explore the 
micro-level and origin theoretical perspectives, rather than the aggregate and destination 
perspectives (ie World Systems, Dual Labor Market Theory, etc).  First, I will discuss the 
neoclassical theory and target income theory, and then I will discuss the social network theory 
and cumulative causation, before finally discussing the most used theoretical perspective when it 
comes to migration, the new economics of migration.  Furthermore, I will examine how each 
theoretical perspective relates to the previously discussed literature on business formation.  
 The Neoclassical economic theory of migration asserts that wage differentials are the 
drivers of migration.  It assumes that migrants are rational individual actors.  If a large enough 
gap between the wages at the origin and destination exists, migration will occur with the 
objective of maximizing lifetime earnings (Lindstrom and Lauster 2001; Massey et al. 1993).  
This simplistic economic theory has been widely critiqued and altered.  
 One manifestation has been the target income theory, which assumes the same push-pull 
factors as the neoclassical view and still retains the economic perspective.  It asserts that 
migrants do not want to leave their origin and when they do they spend as little time away as 
possible.  Migration durations are determined by a target saving: when the migrants have equaled 
their savings objective they return home (Hill 1987).  The idea of target saving is congruent with 
most of the literature of business formation which asserts that migrants that have a target savings, 
which once met could be used to start a business (Portes and Bach 1985).  Additionally, the 
neoclassical theory of migration discusses how poorer communities should see more migration 
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than richer communities, which may be the case for certain Mexican communities.  But the 
literature conversely demonstrates that migration still occurs from economically dynamic 
communities  and the result of the accumulated savings are usually more productive and dynamic 
themselves.  The neoclassical theoretical perspective of migration does not explain business 
formation well, as it focuses exclusively on wage differentials as a motivation rather than how 
these accumulated wages are used upon return. 
 The social network (or network) theory asserts that social networks perpetuate migration.  
It stresses the power of social networks for each stage of the migration process.  Social networks 
help facilitate large-scale migration all across the globe  They make migration easier from the 
origin and destination.  For example, research has shown that having a family member abroad 
not only makes migration more likely but also more profitable (Brown and Bean 2006; 360).  In 
essence networks create economies of scale for migration, which perpetuates large-scale 
migration.  Migrants move to communities where other migrants have already moved; they 
receive information on the destination (e.g., how to get there); and they receive support from 
these networks when they get there (including where to find a job) (Massey et al. 1993).   Once 
these networks are set up they are self-perpetuating, each migrant adds to the network and makes 
it easier, more desirable and even more profitable for subsequent migrants (Brown and Bean 
2006; 365; Massey et al. 1993).  
 Networks add momentum to migration and over time migration comes to sustain itself, 
something Massey (1990; 1993) has referred to as “cumulative causation.”  Massey et al. (1993; 
451) explain: “Causation is cumulative in that each act of migration alters the social context 
within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional 
movement more likely.” These networks and cumulative causation lead to some communities to 
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become more dependent on migration than others.  For example, Chivanda Mexico is dependent 
on migradollars for all of its external funding (Massey and Parrado 1994).  However, the 
relationship between these migrant-dependent communities and business formation is not 
completely understood.  It has been well documented that migrants from communities with better 
economies are more likely to start businesses, but communities that are dependent on migration 
in general may also see increased business formation.   
Both the network theory and cumulative causation stress relative deprivation.  Relative 
deprivation may also lead to business formation as households could see other households 
migrate and improve their standard of living (Massey et al. 1993; 452).  Observing this 
improvement in standard of living motivates the other households to migrate.  Additionally, 
these households could observe the return migrants come home and start a business further 
increasing their income.  Observing this success and feeling more relatively deprived, could 
motivate migration for the specific motivation of business formation.  Specific communities 
could see not only the cumulative causation of migration, but the cumulative causation of 
business formation.  Similarly, those migrants with greater social networks might be more 
inclined to start a business because they would have a greater customer base.   
 The theoretical perspective of New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) has the both 
the most potential and greatest success in explaining the relationship between migration and 
business formation (Stark and Bloom 1985; Massey et al. 1993; Lindstrom and Lauster 2001).  
NELM contrasts with the neoclassical view which stresses that as long as a wage gap persists 
between individuals migration will continue to occur.  For the proponents of NELM, migration is 
not just a method to increase wages it is a method of accumulating capital, diversifying risk and 
overcoming capital constraints (Massey et al. 1993; 436; Brown and Bean 2006).  Unlike in 
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developed countries, where household income risk is attenuated by insurance or well-structured 
social programs, in developing countries households lack such insurance.  Migration helps offset 
the risk.  For example, households dependent on agriculture can minimize their risk by sending a 
household member abroad.  If the crops drop in price or there is a drought, they can count on 
remittances to make up the difference.  This diversification of risk has also been demonstrated on 
an aggregate level.  Remittances have been demonstrated as being “countercyclical,” increasing 
during times of economic hardship and decreasing during economic booms (Acosta et al. 2007; 
2).   
  In addition to minimizing risk, migration is also a way to overcome “market failures”  
and capital constraints as well as inability to access credit markets (Massey et al. 1993; 436).  
For the context of business creation, these market failures may inhibit the development of a 
business.  In developed countries, loans are more accessible through “a sound and efficient 
banking system” (Massey et al. 1993; 438).  In developing countries, loans are more difficult to 
get and usually come from moneylenders who charge high rates of interest.  Not being able to get 
loans to start a business may force a household to engage in migration to earn enough capital to 
start an enterprise.  Lindstrom and Lauster (2001; 1236) explain: “in the absence of well 
developed capital markets, the same conditions encourage temporary migration as a means for 
acquiring capital to finance entrepreneurial activity.”  More than any of the other theoretical 
perspectives, the NELM best explains how migration may be a means to start a business.     
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Chapter IV 
 The Informal Economy and its Implications for Mexico 
 
 In the latter half of the twentieth century the growth of the informal economy in the 
developing world has been unprecedented economically and socially the world has never 
changed so drastically so quickly.  In 2003, the United Nations estimated that 1 billion people 
worked in the informal economy (The Challenge of Slums 2003).  This number has most likely 
increased dramatically.  Latin America in particular has seen especially tremendous growth since 
the 1980s (Davis 2007).  Despite this growth, the causal factors of informality and the influence 
of migration are incompletely understood.  Similarly, the implications of informality on 
development are often debated.  This chapter will discuss the research on informality in Mexico 
and how it relates to migration.  First, this chapter will discuss the prevalence of informality in 
Mexico and how it has grown dramatically over time.  Second, I will attempt to define 
informality and discuss how the definition has changed over time. Third, I will discuss the means 
in which neoliberalism directly caused the incredible growth of informality in Mexico.  Fourth, I 
will discuss how Mexico’s system of business regulation exacerbates informality, through taxes, 
often making it too expensive for small businesses to become licensed.  Fifth, I will outline the 
debate regarding informality and development by first discussing the benefits of informality, 
then how informality may inhibit development.  Then I will describe the ideas of one the most 
outspoken theorists regarding informality, Hernando De Soto, his perspective on informality and 
the critiques of De Soto.  Finally, I will discuss the little research already completed regarding 
the interplay between migration and the informal economy in Mexico.  
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Prevalence of Informality in Mexico:  
Since the early 1980s, the informal economy has grown dramatically in Latin America 
and Mexico specifically.  Current estimates assert that one third to one half of the entire Latin 
American population works in the informal economy (Portes and Hoffman 2003, 24).  Moreover, 
in Mexican urban areas, there are an estimated 900,000 informal street vendors who sell over 13 
billion dollars’ worth of goods per year (this number has probably increased dramatically since 
the estimate) (Merill and Miro 1996).  Past estimates assert that the informal economy is worth 
146 billion dollars (which was more than all of Mexico’s exports) and comprised 46% of all 
urban area jobs (Franco 1999).  Some estimates peg the total number of informal workers at 20 
million, almost one fifth of Mexico’s entire population (Cevallos 2003).  Krajnyak, Magnusson, 
Gash, and Palomba (2010) claim that more than half of all workers in Mexico work for small, 
informal firms (which may be an overestimate).  
Despite the tremendous prevalence of the informal economy, indications are that it will 
continue to grow (Centeno and Portes 2006, 35).  Arias et al. (2010) maintains that the number of 
laborers not covered by social security (a proxy measurement for informality) are still increasing.  
More specifically for the context of this research, the proportion of the Mexican population in 
urban areas that is covered by social security is also declining (Arias et al. 2010).  As the 
informal economy continues to expand and gain both social and economic importance, 
understanding the developmental implications also becomes more crucial (Centeno and Portes 
2006, de Soto 2002).  Moreover, as migration continues to gain social and economic importance 
it becomes increasingly important to understand the relationship between migration and the 
informal sector.    
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Defining Informality 
The informal economic sector has been notoriously difficult to measure, quantify, and 
define (Fernandez-Kelly 2006).  Like most academic terms, the definition of the informal 
economy has changed over time while also being contingent on the current academic milieu 
(Centeno and Portes 2006).  The concept originated with a study in Africa that differentiated 
self-employment and wage employment: self-employment being defined as “informal” (Hart 
1973, Centeno and Portes, 2006).  Then informality was described as the “underemployment” 
that characterized the workers who could not work in the “modern” economy and were forced to 
work for themselves (Centeno and Portes 2006).  Hernando de Soto further asserted that the 
creation of informal economies was a response to the strong “mercantile” regulatory laws in 
Latin America, which forced people to work in unregulated areas of the economy (de Soto 
1989). 
Today, a definition of informal economy has become more commonly accepted and 
agreed upon.  Most simply, informal economic activities are activities that occur beyond 
governmental regulation or control (Portes and Castells 1989, Feige 1990, Centeno and Portes 
2006).  Everything from unlicensed businesses, pirate video sales, to lemonade stands can be 
considered informal economic activities.  Simply put, if an economic activity lacks governmental 
licensing or oversight it should be considered informal.  One of the greatest indicators of 
informal economic activity is the payment of taxes or social security contribution for labor.  The 
payment of taxes and social security contribution indicates formal economic involvement.  By 
definition, informal economic activities and the government will always be in conflict (Centeno 
and Portes 2006, 26).  Moreover, Fernandez-Kelly (2006, 2) asserts that: “Without formal laws 
defining the relationship between employers and workers, the informal economy cannot exist.”   
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However, the informal and formal sectors are not mutually exclusive as often they are 
interrelated on a macroeconomic and microeconomic level (Ratner 2000).  For example 
O’Higgins (1985) asserts:  “The size of the hidden economy is positively related to the size of 
the measured economy and to inflation….(it is a) structural rather than cyclical phenomenon 
(which) explain the growth of the hidden economy.”  For example, when the formal economy 
falters, more workers are pushed to work in the informal sector.  Moreover, at a household level 
informal economic activities usually depend on the formal economy.  Informal workers will 
often buy tools in the formal economy and then use them for their informal labor (Ratner 2000).  
Mobility from one sector to the other has been widely documented, especially among poorer 
workers (Arias et al. 2010, 45). 
It is important to stress that, informal activities need to be differentiated from illegal 
activities, as illegal activities also often occur beyond governmental regulation.  Centeno and 
Portes (2006) differentiate between illegal and informal activities by asserting that illegal 
activities deal with goods that are illicit (such as drugs, arms, and stolen goods), whereas 
informal activities deal with licit goods.  Likewise, some formal economic activities can occur 
illegally, for instance corruption.  So it is unfair to exclusively assume that informal economic 
activities have a stronger relationship with illegal ones.  
  Informal economies have flourished in the third world where there is an absence of both 
will and capacity for widespread economic regulation.  For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa 78% 
of all economic transactions are unregulated (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 2000).   However, developing countries could allow for a more formal economy, if they 
reduced barriers for entry.  Conversely, they could propagate a movement toward the informal 
sector by increasing regulation, making it more difficult to engage in formal work.  Governments 
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thread a fine line.  The informal sector does not exclusively occur in the third world and is 
increasingly prevalent in developed countries (Ratner 2000). 
In summary, the definition of informal economies has changed dramatically over time.  
Informal economic activities can be defined as economic activities that occur beyond the scope 
of governmental regulation.  But it is important to differentiate between informal and illegal 
activities, as the way in which we define these activities has a tremendous influence on not only 
how the government interacts and attempts to control them, but the social and economic 
structures by which the businesses actually operate.  
Neoliberalism and the History of Informality in Latin America 
As discussed above, a considerable proportion of Latin American workers are employed 
in the informal sector.  This did not occur suddenly, but rather it was a result of macro-economic 
restructuring, more specifically the economic restructuring that accompanied neoliberalism.  
Neoliberalism facilitated the proliferation of informality in Latin America in the following four 
ways: first by blurring the line between formal and informal economic activities; second through 
the privatization of formerly formal government-run public employment; third through 
exacerbating economic and social inequality and poverty; and fourth by helping to propagate a 
massive rural to urban migration.  In the following section, these four methods of change will be 
discussed along with how they helped create the massive informal sector in Latin America. 
The first way that neoliberalism propagated informality was by blurring the distinction 
between formal and informal work.  Before neoliberalism, there was both an economic and 
social distinction between formal and informal labor.  Itzigsohn (2006) suggests that not only 
were wages higher in the formal sector, but the formal sector also had greater job security.  The 
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formal sector was a desirable place to work due to these higher wages and benefits.  Conversely, 
those who worked in the informal economy were generally less educated and paid less.  After the 
macro-economic shifts brought on by neoliberalism, the wages in the formal sector declined as 
did the job security (Centeno and Portes 2006, 40).  For example, it is estimated that formal 
factory wages in Mexico paid 60% less after neoliberalism than before.  Likewise, real wages in 
general declined to be 57% in 1998 what they were in 1980 (Gonzalez de la Rocha 2001 243).  
Suddenly, after the austerity measures brought about by the debt crisis, there were few if any 
benefits of working in the formal economy.  The economic and social distinctions between the 
formal and informal economies were blurred.   Furthermore, many have asserted that the shift 
toward neoliberal policies has actually made informal work more “desirable” (Centeno and 
Portes 2006, 40).  More specifically, Izigoshn (2000) asserted that informal work in the 
Caribbean is much more desirable to that “formal” manufacturing work in Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ’s).  Despite the lower wages, informal workers have much greater pride in their 
production as well as well as greater comradely between fellow workers (Izigoshn 2000). 
By dismantling governmental labor standards and regulations, neoliberalism has 
“weakened labor standards,” which again suggests that the once firm distinction between formal 
and informal work became blurred.  Although the informal economy used to be considered for 
the poor, thanks to the macroeconomic and regulatory changes of neoliberalism, not only has the 
distinction between formal and informal work has been blurred, but the informal economy has 
become a desirable, often better place to work.  Itzigsohn (2006, 84) also claims that the blurred 
distinction caused by neoliberalism has led to conditions where “formal income does not provide 
capital for informal enterprises, and formal workers have very little capacity for consumption of 
informal products.”  In summary, aspects of neoliberalism led to a blurred distinction between 
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formal and informal work, while at the same time often making the informal sector a more 
desirable sector to work in. 
 The second manner in which neoliberalism propagated the rise of informality in Latin 
America was through the privatization of formerly government provided services.  As former 
government services were privatized, jobs were taken away from citizens.  Additionally, the 
austerity measures brought on by the Mexican debt crisis forced large budget cuts eliminating 
even more government jobs.  Merill and Miro (1996) describe how during the 1980s the Mexican 
government diverted resources away from the public services and stress that “the government 
used its control of employment opportunities and the labor union movement to hold down wages 
throughout the 1980s in an effort to reduce inflation.”  Centeno and Portes (2006, 38) concur and 
suggest that neoliberalism led to a reduction of public employment which was the “backbone” of 
Latin America’s middle class, who lost their jobs due to the governmental budget cuts.  The 
erosion of the “backbone” of the Latin American middle class employment is evident in that 
unemployment rates increased dramatically from 1982 until 1997 (Shefner 2006, 244).   The loss 
of these formerly secure jobs forced many to turn to self-employment in the informal sector 
(Centeno and Portes 2006, Davis 2007, Merill and Miro 1996). Furthermore, the reduction of 
government jobs increased inequality by eroding the middle class who formerly depended on 
government jobs (Centeno and Portes 2006, Walton 2004).  Additionally, the decline in 
government got rid of the social support system that the citizens were used to, forcing them to 
rely on new informal systems of social support (Itzigsohn 2006).   
 Neoliberalism has been widely documented to exacerbate inequality on a global and local 
scale (Cammack 2009, 298).  In Latin America, the increase in inequality, and the erosion of the 
middle class (discussed above) forced much of the middle class into poverty.  Many turned to the 
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informal economy as their only option for economic survival.  From 1982 (the first year of the 
Mexican debt crisis) until 1997, real wages dropped between 7 to 12% annually.  The decrease in 
wages among the bulk of the population increased the economic inequality within the country.  
Gonzalez de la Rocha (2001, 82) explains: “the richest 10 percent of the population earned 55 
percent more in real terms in 1992 than in 1977 while the real income of other social groups 
declined.”  Similarly, Michael Walton (2004) from the World Bank, who discusses how 
beneficial neoliberalism was for Latin America, agrees that, inequality increased dramatically 
during the shift towards neoliberalism.  He also asserts that there was an increase in the demand 
for qualified tertiary workers (which somehow offsets the increase in poverty).  By increasing 
interest rates in Mexico, the middle class was further eroded, increasing inequality (Shefner 
2006, 245).  The increased inequality through the erosion of the middle class forced many out of 
their middle class jobs, and forced them into the informal economy because they had no other 
economic options.  Neoliberalism has led to the inability of the government to provide social 
services, coupled with the increase in both poverty and inequality.  Gonzalez de la Rocha (2006, 
98) says that the recent transition has shifted the resources in poverty to the poverty of resources.  
The poverty of resources has thus facilitated the growing impoverished population to become 
increasingly reliant on the informal economic sector as the primary source for survival. 
 Although the rural to urban migration is not necessarily a direct result of neoliberal 
policies (some have argued it is see: Davis 2007), it undoubtedly helped to facilitate the growth 
of the informal economy in Latin America, specifically in urban areas.  From 1970 until the 
1980s there was a major redistribution of the impoverished from rural Latin America to the 
urban areas (Davis 2006).   Specifically from 1980 to 1986 Latin American urban poverty 
increased by 50% (Davis 2007, 157).  Industrialization was supposed to absorb a large segment 
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of the rural population and give them formal jobs (Itzigsohn 2006, 83).  But the industry was 
unable to employ all of the rural migrants, and large informal economies (as well as informal 
housing) were subsequently developed by the urban poor who migrated to the city in the hopes 
of finding well paying formal jobs.  Over time, the urban factories, which used to employ a 
majority of the workers, couldn’t compete with Asian manufacturing, and the workers were 
forced into the informal economy for survival.  Guadalajara, a city that was once reliant on 
small-scale manufacturing, was especially decimated by East Asian imports (Davis 2007, 158).  
Once again, the previously employed formal employees were thrust into the informal sector due 
to economic restructuring beyond their control.   
 Additionally, the structural adjustment programs (SAPS) forced upon Latin America 
because of the debt crisis unintentionally facilitated a mass migration to the cities, despite their 
“anti-urban bias” (Davis 2007).  The SAPs reduced or eliminated agricultural subsidies, forcing 
farmers to compete globally.  The farmers often could not compete with the more mechanized 
first world agribusiness (Davis 2007, 152).   With a loss of their former livelihood, many farmers 
were forced to search for work in the cities, and when they could not find formal work (due to 
the restructuring discussed above), they were forced into the informal economy.  The shift from 
internally-oriented development to external neoliberal policies facilitated both the rural to urban 
migration and the subsequent rise of the informal sector in urban areas.  Arias et al. (2010, 37) 
concurs, stating that the proliferation of informal labor in Mexico is due to the rural to urban 
migration. 
In summary, the macroeconomic restructuring of Latin America of the 1980s facilitated 
the proliferation of the informal sector in urban areas.  The rise of the informal sector was an 
unintended consequence of the “Washington Consensus,” economic liberalization policies and 
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austerity measures brought on by the debt crisis (Cammack 2009).  Moreover, these same 
policies propagated both migration and remittance dependence as government support to citizens 
was eroded.  Just like informality, migration may have been a means of economic survival.  
However, the relationship between migration and informality remains unclear.  Did migration 
occur to overcome capital constraints, which then facilitated informal business formation?  More 
specifically, what role did migration play in conjunction with the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s 
to the proliferation of informality in Mexico.  The analysis below will explore this relationship.  
Although neoliberalism has been widely documented to facilitate informality in Latin America, 
the Mexican government has also pushed many businesses into informality with its strict 
regulation policies. 
Informality, Regulation, and Businesses in Mexico 
Informality is always a “response to a flawed regulatory system” (Arias et al., 2010; 5).  
Mexico has strict and numerous regulatory laws enacted for formal businesses.  These laws were 
enacted to make Mexican businesses more competitive internationally.  However, some have 
argued that the laws have backfired, discouraging the creation of formal licensed businesses and 
encouraging informal businesses (Arias et al. 2010).  In 2001 Mexico was estimated to have the 
highest Index of Labor Rigidity, making it one of the most difficult places to engage in formal 
economic business ownership in the world (Arias et al. 2010, 9).  There are not only numerous 
bureaucracies, but it is expensive for formal businesses to operate due to high forced 
contributions to social security as well as laws making it difficult to hire or fire workers and 
resolve capricious labor disputes in courts (Arias et al. 2010, 12).   In fact, Tokeman (1992, 62) 
asserts: “The businesses that do fulfill their obligations are faced with total costs that vary 
between 28 and 50% of their profits.”  By deciding to locate in the formal sector, businesses can 
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hurt their profit margins.  This encourages informal or unlicensed competitors to flourish.  
Tokeman (1992, 72) suggests that the economic sanctions accompanied with regulation, 
“encourages evasion.”  More specifically, Tokeman suggests that informal businesses may 
flourish during times of economic downturn, as the profits are being hurt already, so it would be 
illogical to cut profits further through registration.  
Furthermore, the enforcement of contracts by the Mexican government is extremely 
ineffective.  The policies directly make doing business in Mexico more expensive (Arias et al. 
2010, 10).  To avoid these expenses, Mexico has turned a blind eye toward a proliferation of 
informal businesses and informal labor (Arias et al. 2010).  The burgeoning growth of the 
informal sector in Mexico decreases productivity and investment by reducing taxes and capital 
accumulation thereby making the economy less productive and efficient (Arias et al. 2010).   
Arias et al. (2010) like de Soto, suggests that regulation and taxation inhibit capitalistic 
entrepreneurship and should be eliminated in Mexico.  Ironically, these ideas echo the principles 
of neoliberalism, which helped to facilitate informality in Mexico.  Arias et al. (2010), also 
suggest that the reduction of taxes and regulation would: “attract more firms into formality and 
raise the public resources to invest in its infrastructure.”  There is no doubt that unnecessary 
regulation can cause a shift toward informality.  However, the elimination of all regulations and 
taxations would not necessarily move everyone to the formal sector, nor would it lead to 
substantial economic development.  Apparently Mexico has experienced the “perfect storm” for 
informality.  Not only has macro-economic restructuring forced much of the population into the 
informal sector, but strict governmental regulation and taxation forces many businesses into the 
informal sector.  Although the causes of informality are well understood, their implications for 
development are more murky.   
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The Implications of Informality on Development 
Like informality itself, the implications of informality on development are not well 
understood.  Recently, the perception of informality has become negative thanks to the popular 
and widespread work of Hernando De Soto.  However, informal economies in developing 
countries do have their economic and social benefits.  In this section I will first discuss the 
economic benefits of informality, before discussing how the informal economy may hurt a 
country as it attempts to develop.  Many have described the benefits of informality, mainly 
asserting that the informal sector is “functional” in the sense that it provides employment and 
economic opportunities for those who otherwise would have none (Centro and Portes 2006, 33).  
In other words, informal economies provide employment for a large proportion of the population 
that would otherwise be jobless or have no access to any capital.  Aside from providing extra 
jobs, the production and services provided by the informal sector decreases costs for the entire 
economy, both labor and goods.   For example, a formal company that hires someone off of the 
books can save money by not having to have to pay the benefits of formal employment.  The off-
books employee receives compensation.  Similarly, informal markets can bring down costs of 
formal markets by charging less due to the fact that they did not have to pay for licenses or other 
taxes to the government, reducing costs for everyone in the economy.  Informal economies can 
mitigate inflation. 
In fact, without the informal economy, it would be significantly more expensive to live in 
the developing world, as costs for both labor and goods would be much higher (Centeno and 
Portes 2006).  The informal economy creates an arbitrage between markets, lowering both prices 
and costs.  Centeno and Portes (2006, 34) conclude that the informal economy acts as a “de 
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facto” system of welfare, providing economic and social opportunities for the lower class and 
most impoverished.   
The benefits of the informal sector are not exclusively economic.  Itzigoshn (2006) has 
described the social benefits of the informal sector.  He asserts that those engaged in the informal 
sector depend on each other for economic success, as they face similar economic challenges.  
Their collaboration is especially impressive considering they have no formal leader, as well as 
the challenge of organizing meetings between everyone engaged in the markets.  Recent research 
asserts that social support in the informal sector is most common in the formation of new 
businesses.  Similarly, trust is a crucial aspect of informality; despite a lack of regulation, 
informal factories have received global contracts for export because of a highly regulated system 
of working control and pooled effort (Itzigoshn 2006, 87).  Through the promotion of 
collaboration between workers, informal businesses have been able to “expand (their) markets” 
(Itzigoshn 2006, 87).   For example, artisans who were tired of the high prices charged by 
middlemen worked together to sell their products (lessening their dependence on middlemen) 
while expanding their markets (Itzigoshn 2006, 87).  Itzigoshn (2006, 89) indicates there are two 
causes of the formation of these social networks of trust: the ability to increase profit and a 
shared social and economic identity.  These social networks have also been demonstrated to help 
those involved find formal work (Ratner 2002).   
Another often overlooked benefit of the informal economy is that it deters involvement in 
illegal activities.  Ratner (2002) discovered that rural women in Appalachia who augmented their 
work in the informal sector were less likely to turn to illegal activities (Ratner 2002).  Without 
the informal economy in Mexico, the drug violence could be even worse. The prevalent 
collaboration evident in the informal economy helps to unite the impoverished to better 
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themselves economically and socially without turning to drug gangs.  The benefit of this 
collaboration at a community scale is not well understood. 
Another benefit of informality may be that trying to formalize previously informal 
businesses has been disastrous.  In Chicago, the successful Maxwell Street market was 
formalized to increase taxes for the city government.  The businesses were forced to get licenses.  
But only half made the transition.  The Maxwell Street market could not survive and many lost 
their source of income, both those who formalized and those who did not.  The Maxwell Street 
market transition is not an isolated phenomenon, as numerous attempts to formalize businesses 
across the world have “floundered” (Williams and Windebank 1998).  Attempting to formalize 
businesses does not necessarily lead to development; in fact, they can exacerbate poverty. 
 In summary, after the macro-economic restructuring brought on by neoliberalism, the 
development of informal industry and economy has become a necessity for the impoverished in 
the developing world.  For those who lack formal economic opportunities, it provides a safety 
net to find work.  Similarly, for the most impoverished it lowers prices, making life affordable.  
In Mexico it is also beneficial that workers can turn to the informal sector rather than working 
for the increasingly powerful and violent drug cartels.  Without the informal sector, millions 
would live in destitute poverty with no other options for work.  Although what the informal 
market provides is obviously beneficial, there are some detriments to informality, specifically in 
the area of economic growth.   
Costs of informality 
 As demonstrated above, the informal economy does help support some of the most 
impoverished in Mexico.  There are clearly benefits from the existence of the informal economy.  
 
 
46 
 
However, the prevalence of informal markets may inhibit economic growth on a broader scale, at 
both the community and national level.  The following section will address how informal 
markets may inhibit economic development. 
First, a widespread informal economy weakens the public’s perspective on the 
effectiveness of regulation in specific industries and in government more generally.  Centeno and 
Portes believe that the only reason why the informal sector exists is because of the government’s 
failure to regulate the economy.   Since the state cannot enforce its economic laws, it seems 
weaker in all aspects, weakening the public perceptions of the state’s ability to both govern and 
protect.  In essence, the prevalence of informality perpetuates a sense of “underdevelopment and 
political backwardness” (Centeno and Portes 2006, 34).  
  Similarly, without the protection of the government, entrepreneurs engaged in informal 
work must find their own methods to enforce fairness in transactions.  Without regulation, and 
contracts specifically, the informal market is less reliable and safe.  The lack of reliability can 
sometimes increase transaction costs, as sellers are forced to rely on middlemen or “enforcers” 
who can increase the costs of transactions (Centeno and Portes 2006, 34).  Moreover, some have 
asserted that the system of regulation “favors larger businesses and discriminates against smaller 
ones.”  The lack of regulation discourages the creation of more efficient and profitable 
institutions, perpetuating both poverty and underdevelopment for the most impoverished while 
forcing them into the informal sector (Centeno and Portes 2006, 35).  The cards seem stacked 
against everyone in the informal sector, creating a cycle of inescapable poverty and informality. 
A strong association has been demonstrated between economic inefficiency and 
informality; this economic inefficiency can slow development (Arias et al. 2010, 30).  The 
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association does not mean that informality causes economic inefficiency, but rather that less 
productive businesses choose not to be licensed (or lack the means to become formal) and are 
thus informal (Arias et al. 2010, 33).  De Soto, suggests that informal businesses are withheld by 
regulation and taxes.  However in reality informal businesses have been documented as often 
being less productive than formal businesses to begin with (Arias et al. 2010).  That is not to say 
that being informal makes them less productive, but rather that smaller businesses choose not to 
get licensed.  In fact, some have suggested that the only reason that informal businesses are able 
to stay open is due to the fact that they are in essence subsidized by the funds they save by not 
paying taxes (Arias et al. 2010; La Porta and Shleifer 2008).  However, La Porta and Shleifer 
(2008) also suggest that the economy will eventually work out the informal businesses as it 
becomes more efficient.  But that view seems unrealistic compared to the recent proliferation of 
informality in Latin America.  In addition to economic inefficiency, human capital accumulation 
may be slowed by work in the informal economy.  Research has indicated that “returns to work 
experience are lower in the informal sector” (Arias et al. 2010, 34).   Formal workers in Mexico 
see much higher returns to work (almost over 1% higher in 2006).  However, like economic 
inefficiency, this could be self-selection, as those with the most to gain from a human capital 
standpoint most likely work in the formal sector, whereas those who work in the informal sector 
are often lack human and economic capital. 
Despite the fact that neoliberalism has blurred the distinction between the formal and 
informal economic sectors, the prevalence of the informal sector has perpetuated social and 
economic inequality.  Centeno and Portes (2006, 37) assert: “In a sense, the functionality of the 
informal sector for the state and firms in the formal economy depends precisely on the 
continuing vulnerability and poverty of those laboring in underground activity.”  They argue that 
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the high prevalence of informality will create a divide between the minority wealthy, formal elite 
and the overwhelming majority of poor who work in the informal sector.  Similarly, the Marxist 
perspective on informal economies maintains that workers in the informal sector are being 
exploited, but through less direct and explicit methods (Bonacich and Light 1991).  The divide 
between formal and informal work is furthering the divide between rich and poor, leading to a 
bimodal distribution of the wealth.  Some have argued that bimodalization of wealth is a direct 
result of neoliberalism, just like informality (Harvey 2005).  Economic hierarchies exist in the 
informal sector just like the formal economic sector, and these hierarchies further promote 
inequality (Ratner 2002).   
Inequality may not have as drastic effect on economic development as government tax 
collection.  Informal economic activities remain largely if not entirely untaxed.  Although, 
formal firms may save money by avoiding taxes, as they continue to grow they face increasing 
costs of evasion (Arias et al. 2010; 32).  The reduced taxes inhibit local or state governments 
from accessing the money and reinvesting it in the community.  Lewsi (2004) suggests that 
informal businesses are not only less productive than formal ones, but that by not paying taxes 
they act as parasites for the entire community.   Not only do they do not contribute taxes, but 
they also steal the market share from the more productive, taxpaying formal businesses.  The 
lack of tax dollar reinvestment can be particularly devastating for communities dependent on 
remittances.  For example, Grindle (1988) discusses how the developmental potential of 
remittances is often withheld by a lack of infrastructure.  He claims that when communities have 
better infrastructure remittances are more likely to be used productively (Grindle 1988).  
However, when communities evolve to become dependent on remittances, a positive feedback 
loop emerges.  The community becomes increasingly dependent on remittances.  With no tax 
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dollars, the community cannot build infrastructure to offset dependence on remittances.  In 
addition, when remittances are used to create informal businesses, this cycle of dependence is 
further exacerbated.   Similarly, neither remittances nor informal businesses contribute to the 
social benefits of formal pay, most importantly government-operated retirement programs can 
falter because of informal economies.  By not paying taxes, the government must look elsewhere 
for funds to support social services, the same social services that those who engage in informal 
work depend on.  So, workers in the informal sector contribute little to no taxes and depend on 
the government for services (Centro and Portes 2006, 35).   Finally, to compound the problem, 
the government has trouble taxing the elite as they have the power to avoid tax collection.    
Hernando De Soto and the Costs of the Informal Economy 
One of the most prominent and outspoken theorists regarding the relationship between 
the informal economy and economic development is Hernando De Soto.  Most contemporary 
developmental theories have a pessimistic outlook on the prospects of global development.  Ever 
since failures of developmental initiatives in Latin America and Africa, few developmental 
theories have been welcomed.  Because of all the failure in developmental policy, few 
economists have created new policies.  Recently, however, a more optimistic paradigm in 
development has been slowly emerging.  Hernando De Soto a finalist for the 2002 Nobel Peace 
Prize in economics has become the face of this new focus.  Bill Clinton called De Soto “The 
world’s greatest living economist” (Davenport 2004; 2).  Both American political parties have 
embraced his suggested policies regarding the selection of areas of the economy to receive aid 
(Davenport 2004).  Gravois (2001; 1) explains: "For the left, de Soto has formulated the most 
seemingly practical ideas for reducing global poverty. For the right, de Soto offers the most 
compelling way to market capitalism to the poor.” 
 
 
50 
 
De Soto and his theoretical perspective on informality and development have gained 
traction for the following reasons.  First, although De Soto has a negative view of informality, he 
has a very positive perspective on the prospects of broader economic development.  Second, 
most theories regarding development in the Third World are complex, De Soto’s perspective is 
relatively simple and easy to understand.  He argues, most simply that the incredible prevalence 
of informality in the developing world is withholding economic development. 
  De Soto claimed that the informal economy prevents the 3
rd
 world from accessing 9 
trillion dollars of fungible assets (Goldman, 2007).  He refers to informality as “dead capital.”  
This “dead capital” thus reduces the developing world’s economic growth potential.  De Soto 
observed that the unregulated informal economies withhold usable capital (De Soto 2002).  For 
example, because of homeownership licenses in America, we use our houses as collateral to 
receive loans.  These loans also help facilitate bank growth, which in turn helps increase savings 
and other loans that can be used for what De Soto called “economic entrepreneurship.”  (De Soto 
2002; 40).  In fact, Americans most often use their house as collateral to start a small business.  
De Soto compared the dead capital to energy:  once the energy is infused into the economy, there 
will be a multiplier effect (De Soto 2002; 43).  The capital is presently dormant, withheld by a 
lack of effective formalization policy, but once it is energized, the new funds will facilitate the 
economic growth of the third world (De Soto 2002; 45).  More specifically, De Soto is concerned 
with homeownership: by making third world citizens into homeowners their increased assets will 
facilitate more entrepreneurial activities (such as formal business creation), which will lead to 
economic entrepreneurship, abating poverty on a global scale.  Through formalization policies 
De Soto thinks he has a silver bullet for global poverty. 
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Given that the majority of migradollars are spent on consumption, housing, and land, we 
can apply De Soto’s perspective to see the benefits of formalization policy on migradollar 
spending.  One of De Soto’s key points is that the formalization of land and housing through 
increased licensing or titles would “make assets fungible” (De Soto, 2002: 57).  He argued that 
formalization, specifically of housing, would make the assets “easily combined, divided, 
mobilized and used to stimulate business deals” (De Soto 2002; 56).  The once dormant capital 
suddenly becomes: “Fungible able to be fashioned to suit practically on any transaction.” (De 
Soto 2002; 56).  With the newly fungible assets, owners become attached to their assets (De Soto 
2002; 58).  Homeowners would see migradollars spent on housing turn into an investment.  
These attachments to investments create economic networks.  Because of the increased political 
and economic power, these networks would demand infrastructure, such as utilities and 
transportation routes (De Soto 2002; 60).  Roads may be built that create new trade 
opportunities, schools that provide education, and police stations that lessen crime and corruption 
could all be the result of the economic networks that would be created by formalization policy.  
Likewise, infrastructure would be able to be built with new taxes gathered by formalizing the 
informal.  This infrastructure is desperately needed by the remittance-dependent states of Mexico 
and could create new economic industries that would lessen the reliance on migradollars and 
informality, reversing the “culture of dependency” (Kapur 2004; 13).    
Similar to a positive feedback, the demand for infrastructure would lead to more 
economic growth through the creation of new jobs and new industries to meet the new economic 
network’s needs.  These jobs would attract laborers who once might have looked for work 
abroad, lessening the financial dependence on migradollars.  Finally, increased formalization of 
land rights and businesses would also protect transactions.  The buyers and sellers would have 
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increased confidence in the economic system.  Economic confidence is desperately needed in the 
developing world.  The confidence would increase economic transitions in the formal economy.  
New industries would be created to not only aid the protection of transactions, but other 
industries would be created by the spinoff effects of the benefits of an increasing formal 
economy. The property would become more than just paper; it would become the backbone of a 
new capitalistic based society (De Soto, 2002: 65). 
This potential growth due to formalization in the developing world would be comparable 
to the economic benefits that the “Fordism” policies, enacted by the United States in the 1950’s 
had on the American economy (Porter and Sheppard 2006: 410).  Through the subsidization of 
construction in the 1950s, new industries were created.  A transportation network grew in 
demand as the suburbs emerged.  Automobiles became more necessary.  The government not 
only changed the economic framework of the United States, it changed the American lifestyle.   
The objective of this thesis is to explore the relationship between migration and business 
formation.  As discussed above, some migradollars go toward the foundation of small 
enterprises.  These spending patterns can lead to more economic opportunities.  They can 
facilitate small enterprises, family businesses, or small-scale agriculture.  Licensing could also 
benefit these small businesses.  Formalization would provide some regulatory standards that 
could increase quality and international demand.  After creating an infrastructure that met 
European quality standards, new markets have grown around Lake Victoria in Tanzania based on 
the exportation of the Nile Perch (Darwin’s Nightmare 2004).  Licenses turned a small, informal, 
subsistence-based fishing industry into a million dollar international industry (Darwin’s 
Nightmare 2004).    
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Another example of formalization policy transformation comes from Thailand.  Tuk-Tuk 
taxis of Bangkok were once considered unsafe and were used only by locals.  Through 
formalization processes such as registration, licensing, and testing, the Tuk-Tuk’s experienced 
widespread demand.  The regulation increased tourist confidence, perceptions of safety, and 
standardization (Tourism Authority of Thailand; 2006).  A Tuk-Tuk ride has become a staple of 
a trip to Bangkok, and the once small business has seen profits skyrocket (Tourism Authority of 
Thailand 2006).  An increase in formalization policy concerning businesses could facilitate 
greater gains with migradollar spending.      
As a condition to accession to the European Union in the 1990s, Poland was forced to 
completely formalize its pork industry.  For generations many people in rural Poland lived as 
subsistence pork farmers (Dunn 2003).  As a condition of accession, the entire pork industry was 
formalized and standardized to meet the stringent safety standards of the European Union.  The 
economic and social effects were dramatic.  The substance farming processes suddenly became 
unhygienic and unacceptable for international trade.  The livelihoods of millions had to change.  
To meet the formalization standards the pig production was corporatized and reorganized in old 
communist collective processing plants.  As the plants slowly were transformed to meet the 
European Union’s quality standards, pork became profitable and the export of pork escalated 
dramatically in the European market (Dunn 2003).  Former informal subsistence production 
became a transnational rationalized industry.  The formalization of the pork industry displaced 
millions of rural livelihoods, but it also helped to modernize and integrate Poland’s economy into 
the global economy (Dunn 2003).  However, it is important to note the small-scale farmers were 
forced out of the market and black markets for pork erupted. 
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 If Mexico wants to engage in formalization, the country needs to be simple and 
accessible to the whole public.  For example, in Peru it takes a citizen 207 steps in 52 different 
government offices and over $1,000 to be granted the title to build on state-owned land (De-Soto 
2002).  Sociologist Max Weber described such systems as “irrationalities generated by rational 
systems” and as the “Iron Cage of Rationality”(Ferantte 2005; 195).  He said that the iron cage of 
rationality is applicable to any modern bureaucracy.  In the developing world Weber noticed that 
the trained specialization of each branch creates “red tape” and unnecessary steps to be 
completed.  Employees familiar only with what they are trained to do and not familiar with other 
branches of governmental policy, create numerous superfluous steps that lead to inefficiency in 
the government and an inability of the populace to understand the system.  Economist Thorstein 
Veblen described this phenomenon of organizational ineffectiveness as “trained incapacity” 
(Ferrante 2005; 197).  The process of applying for licenses and other formalizations must be 
easier in order to facilitate formalization.  In essence, the iron cage of rationality, must be 
simplified and made more rational for “dead capital” to be made “fungible.” 
Although De Soto may be the most outspoken author and theorist regarding informality, 
his perspective on the developmental implications of informality has become widely critiqued.  
De Soto’s suggested policies seemingly assert that overtly complex regulations withhold 
economic growth (often in the form of bureaucracy).  The idea that regulation and government 
withholds economic growth is not original; in fact, it echoes the very principles of neoliberalism.  
As discussed above, the diffusion of neoliberal policies both promoted and facilitated the growth 
of informality in Latin America.  Ironically De Soto’s policies which are seemingly a response to 
the latent consequences of neoliberalism the growth of the informal, share the same ideology of.  
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  According to De Soto, informality impedes economic growth throughout the developing 
world and formalization will act as a silver bullet which will allow an escape from poverty.  His 
silver bullet plan does not take into account the economic and social differences between third 
world countries or the wider structural constraints that have withheld development for centuries 
(Porter and Sheppard 1998).     
Despite the limitations of his theoretical framework, the very results of De Soto’s policies 
have been documented as being ineffective at best and disastrous at worst.  For example, in his 
home city of Lima, Peru, the policies of implementing formal property rights only lead to a 24% 
financing rate, almost none of which was from private banks.  This is the opposite of what de 
Soto predicted (Gravois 2006).  Most of the financing in fact was supplied by the state and did 
not necessarily connect those engaged in informal work with the formal economy.  Moreover, 
the residents were much more likely to use local resources or the government rather than borrow 
from the bank (Gilbert 2002, 16).  The most impoverished are much more likely to use their own 
local resources to get loans rather than a formal bank, even with titles (Gilbert 2002, 17).  Gilbert 
(2002) has demonstrated that sources of loans in Bogata, Columbia, are similar, despite having a 
title. 
 For De Soto, the modest success in Lima is a success story, as the granting of property 
rights has actually hurt the most impoverished in other countries.  For example in Phnom Phen, 
Cambodia, slum dwellers were allowed to formalize their property near the center of the city.  
Their land was bought by wealthy speculators, who purchased the formal property rights and 
then developed the area. The slum dwellers were then displaced to a location outside of the city.  
The slum dwellers could no longer afford to commute to work into the city as their wages were 
less than the cost of a commute (Gravois 2005).  The formalization policies clearly did not 
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benefit the most impoverished; rather they benefited the elite in Phnom Phen, exaserbating both 
poverty and inequality.   Phnom Phen illustrates that through the formalization of property rights, 
the most impoverished might be forced out of their homes off of their land, or out of business. 
Since Latin America is De Soto’s home, and the focus of this thesis, the implications of 
De Soto’s policies in Latin America should be discussed.  In Latin America, most informal 
residential areas are actually either paid for or protected by a politician (Gilbert 2002).  So they 
are rarely in danger of demolition or destruction (like in Phonom Phen).  However, this state of 
informal housing does often lack infrastructure and services, something that licensing could 
improve.  Similarly, Gilbert (2002, 8) says: “It is much less expensive to issue property titles 
than to provide settlements with services.”  Many have asserted that the provision of 
infrastructure can facilitate development (Portes 2006).  So, by providing licenses instead of 
services, informal neighborhoods could remain in poverty rather than escape it as De Soto 
suggests.  De Soto also suggests that having a title facilitates house improvement (Gilbert 2002).  
But research in Latin America has demonstrated that titles do not facilitate housing 
improvement; rather housing improvements (or investment in housing) motivate the residents to 
get titles (Gilbert 2002).  Another aspect of the Latin American housing market to De Soto’s 
argument is the lack of residential mobility in urban Latin America.  Most residents in informal 
areas are place bound--in fact there is a “virtual absence of a housing market” (Gilbert 2002, 13).  
How can licenses help anyone if the residents cannot sell their houses?  Finally, and perhaps 
most damaging to De Soto’s argument, is that “a legal title makes little or no difference to the 
availability of formal finance” (Gilbert 2002, 14).  Even with titles, banks have not loaned to the 
most impoverished as they still have to demonstrate a form of income.  In a vicious circle of 
poverty, the poor cannot readily demonstrate a source of income.  Furthermore, banks are 
 
 
57 
 
hesitant about loaning to the poor due the fact that they fear defaulting on loans, and most 
importantly, low profitability of these loans (Gilbert 2002, 15).  In summary, in Latin America 
there is neither a desirable housing market nor a supply of formal loaning institutions, making 
titles for informal housing almost irrelevant for development, which is congruent with what 
Hirschman (1984) concluded. 
Although De Soto’s perspective on informality has been widely critiqued and his policy 
implementations have largely been ineffective (like most developmental policies), he has brought 
attention to the increasingly important informal sector.  His policies may not be effective, but his 
perspective could eventually influence some effective policies.  Similarly, he may overestimate 
the influence of housing and not look enough at informal businesses.  Through simplifying the 
registration process and lowering taxes on businesses, households that engage in migration could 
more easily formalize their businesses.  This may propagate further investment in the business as 
well as lead to the other benefits mentioned by De Soto.  Although his policies (specifically with 
housing) have been unsuccessful in the past, formalizing the increasing number of businesses 
started by return migrants may have substantial developmental potential. 
Migration and Informality: 
There has been little research conducted regarding the relationship between the influence 
of migration on informality.  Most likely, the relationship is endogenous, with migration 
propagating informality and informality also propagating migration.  As remittances and capital 
accumulated while abroad are overwhelmingly not taxed in the home country they can be 
considered informal.  So in essence, communities have incredibly substantial flows of informal 
capital into their economies.  What is the influence of so much informality on the community?  
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Additionally, what is the influence of the flow of capital on future migration?  There has been 
very little research linking migration to informality in Latin America.   
 By removing some of the poorest segments of the population from Mexico to the United 
States, migration may be taking away a substantial proportion of the informal labor force.  In 
some communities, the choice remains either to migrate or to work in the informal sector.  Most 
individuals can gain greater returns through international migration, so they decide to migrate.  
However, the informal sector can be maintained through the consumption patterns of 
migradollars (Macias 2009) migrants and their families spend their remittances in the informal 
sector, perpetuating its existence.   
 The objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between migration and business 
formation.  Past research has indicated that return migrants most often start “petty retail 
establishments” (Massey and Parrado 1998).  Although this suggests that migrants are more 
likely to start businesses in the informal sector, no research has specifically examined the 
relationship between how migrants contribute to the informal sector through business formation.  
The next section will actually examine the theoretical perspectives with quantitative methods. 
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Chapter V 
 Data and Methods 
In this chapter, I describe the nature of the data examined in this investigation and the 
analytical procedures implemented to answer the study’s research. Beginning with the data, I 
examine the two major sources, the Mexican Migration Project and the Mexican Census.  In 
addition, I will explain my rationale for inclusion of particular figures and acknowledge 
limitations of these data points in the context of the investigation. In the next major section, I 
examine the analytical methods that are used in this research. I explain and justify the 
implementation of multilevel binary and multinomial logistic regression techniques on time 
varying data that help to distinguish the formation of formal and informal businesses by a 
previously developed criteria. 
Data 
The two sources of data used in this investigation are the Mexican Migration Project and 
the Mexican census, which contain data at various scales.  The household-level data for the 
analysis come from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), whereas the community-level data 
come from the Mexican census: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática 
(INEGI).  The MMP is a combined effort between the University of Princeton and the University 
of Guadalajara (Massey et al., 1990).   The data are made available without cost to anyone with 
an Internet connection. The MMP has data from 128 Mexican communities selected because 
they represent a broad array of socioeconomic and urbanization characteristics.  The first four 
were selected to analyze areas that had not yet been analyzed by other studies, had an existing 
out flow of migrants, and represented four categories of urbanization (Massey et al. 1987).  After 
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the communities were selected, maps were drawn of all the dwellings in the community, each 
dwelling was numbered, then through a random number generator roughly 200 dwellings to be 
interviewed were selected (Massey et al. 1987).  Each year since 1987, four to six additional 
communities are added, making the data base increasingly “historically rich” (Massey et al. 
1987).  The communities were selected “to cover a wide spectrum of urbanization and 
socioeconomic conditions” (Riosmena 2009; 327) and not because of their high migration 
prevalence, though most communities have at least some history of U.S. migration. 
The variables in the MMP describe business and property ownership, labor, marriage, 
migration histories, and numerous other important variables (Massey et al., 1990).  The MMP 
not only has data on migrants, but also contains data on households not engaged in migration, 
which allow for the comparison between the factors that predict business formation in migrant 
and non-migrant households.  The data from the MMP were collected by employing a semi-
structured interviewing technique called the ethnosurvey to collect quantitative data (Massey et 
al., 1990, 14).  The ethnosurvey technique involves open-ended questions by trained interviewers 
(Massey et al. 1990, 15).  The data are then coded, quantified, tested for errors, and put on an 
online database accessible to the public (see http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu).  
 The household-level MMP data were merged with the second source of data, the 
community-level Mexican census data (INEGI).  The INEGI data were used for the community 
variables collected; the INEGI is used by governmental demographers and researchers alike.  
Since the Mexican census data are collected only once every ten years, I assumed that the growth 
or decline between decades was constant.  Although this may be a faulty assumption considering 
the economic turmoil caused by the economic crises of 1982, 1988, and 1994, I simply did not 
have better data. 
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Although the MMP is a tremendous resource for analyzing the broader social process of 
migration from Mexico to the United States, it has often been critiqued for not being 
representative.  Since communities with specific characteristics are continuously selected, a bias 
exists regarding the communities sampled.  Specifically, the procedure may have led to an over 
representation of migrant-heavy communities in western states (Massey and Zenteno 2000).  
However, when the data were compared to that coming from a nationally-representative sample, 
the ENADID (Encuesta Nacional de la Dinamica Demografica), MMP data were not 
substantially different. Massey and Zenteno (2000; 789) assert: “Although the ethnosurvey 
design of the MMP over-represents migrants from Mexico’s western states and from mid-sized 
communities, this fact appears to matter little when it comes to constructing an accurate profile 
of the population of Mexico-U.S. migrants.”  More importantly for the context of this research, 
the migration characteristics were “remarkably consistent” (Massey and Zenteno 2000, 789) 
between the MMP and ENADID.  However, it is not necessarily clear if the businesses formed in 
this sample are representative of all businesses formed in Mexico during the time of the survey. 
All data sets are somewhat problematic; however the MMP was selected because of its extensive 
data regarding both migration and business formation variables, which no other survey includes. 
In addition, given my interest in understanding the role of place in informal and formal business 
formation, MMP data are also useful as they are representative at the community level, a scale 
that other surveys oftentimes do not accurately represent. 
As discussed previously, most entrepreneurial opportunities in rural areas are informal, 
whereas there is more differentiation in urban areas.  The analysis will thus focus on urban areas 
alone, meaning all communities in the sample in localities with a population of under 2,500 were 
eliminated.  Further, all communities where the interviews were conducted before 1998 were 
 
 
62 
 
also eliminated, because questionnaire re-design in 1997 renders communities surveyed before 
and after this year less comparable (the MMP contains communities that have been interviewed 
since 1987, so 11 years worth of ethnosurveys were eliminated).  This sample selection yielded 
9,460 households in 54 communities. I used the business history on the MMP for business 
formation information.  If a business was in the retrospective 25-year window used, it was coded 
as a 1: however, they were differentiated into two groups: formal and informal.  Out of the 1,104 
businesses formed in the sample, 919 were coded as informal businesses and 185 were coded as 
formal businesses according to criteria described below and shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 demonstrates the distributions of the household-level variables (including the 
dependent variable, informal business creation.  Migration will be examined in two ways.  First, 
a dummy variable was created to examine current migration.   If the head is currently in the 
United States for the year they receive a 1.  All years they are home are coded as 0.  Then, after 
the head has returned, a new variable is coded 1 as a measure for migration experience.   During 
4% of the household years, the head is currently in the United States, while for 8%, the head has 
returned.  The vast majority of the sample had no migration experience.  Two variables were 
included to control for previous capital attainment, the number of new houses purchased and the 
number of new properties purchased specifically for a new business.  Once again, a vast majority 
of the sample did not purchase new property during the sampling frame.  To examine the life 
cycle stage of the household, the age of the head was included.  Head age is often used as a 
proxy measurement for life cycle stage.  Household educational attainment was also controlled 
for, using the average number of years of education per person in the household (controlling for 
age).  Finally, the number of children in different age groups were included in each group to 
examine the influence of children on informal business creation.  Some like Davis (2007), have 
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asserted that children are often used as labor in informal businesses.  All of these variables were 
coded to change over time, so as the head aged, he was given years of age, just like the children. 
Right censoring occurred after the last (most recent) business was formed or the year of the 
survey. After the removal of data, the household year selection yields a total of 91,159 household 
years. 
 
Household-Level Scale  
 The variables at level one of analysis are at the household level.   In an analysis of 
migration generally and especially its influence on business formation, the household remains by 
Table 1. Mexican Household-Level Descriptive Statistics, 1980-2010
Type of Business Percentage Number
  Formal 2% 185
  Informal 10% 919
  None 88% 8356
Migration Experience Percentage of Household Years
  Return Migration 8%
  Current Migration 4%
  No Migration 88%
Property Percentage of Households 
Business Properties with new property
  New Business Property 2%
  No New Business Property 98%
Housing Properties
  New Housing Property 14%
  No New Housing Property 86%
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Head Age 43.1 13.5 11 101
Years of Household Education 6.5 3.9 0 21
Number of Children
  0 to 4 0.51 0.75 0 5
  5 to 12 0.93 1.15 0 8
  13 to 17 0.60 0.91 0 6
General Descriptive Statistics
Households 9460
Communities 54
Household Years 91159
Source: Mexican Migration Project
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far the best scale for analysis for the following three reasons.  First, Massey et al. (1987) found 
that migration decisions in Mexico are most often determined at the household level.  Second, 
the theoretical perspective of the New Economics of Labor Migration (Stark and Bloom 1985) 
asserts that the household rather than the individual makes migration decisions, and the 
household can use migration as methods to combat capital failures (such as inadequate access to 
capital) and gain capital to start a business.  Finally, as demonstrated by Tokeman (1992), 
businesses, especially informal businesses, often use family members as labor.  For these three 
reasons, the scale of this analysis will be at the household level.     
Dependent Variable: Type of Business Created 
Although the MMP contains detailed information regarding any businesses formed by a 
household, it does not contain information as to whether they are licensed or not (in other words 
it lacks an explicit designation of them being formal or informal).  Therefore, I had to 
differentiate businesses into categories based on criteria from previous research. The criteria 
employed to differentiate informal from formal businesses are based on previous research by 
Tokeman (1992), whose objective was to examine which types of businesses were located in the 
different sectors of the Mexican economy. Tokeman (1992) was able to describe the 
characteristics of these businesses while also creating criteria for differentiation between formal 
and informal businesses in urban Mexico. Although his findings are dated, they are instructive 
because they match up well with questions asked regarding the businesses in the MMP.   
Tokeman (1992) identified three specific criteria to differentiate between formal and 
informal businesses.  First, the utilization of family members is a crucial variable that 
differentiates between formal and informal businesses.  Obviously, informal businesses are much 
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more likely to employ family members than are formal businesses.  Second, just as a high 
prevalence of family workers is reflective of an informal business, a larger number of workers in 
general suggest that a business is located in the formal economy.  Larger businesses are much 
more likely to comply with regulation than are smaller businesses; they also have the capital to 
survive the costs of taxes and registration (Arias et al. 2010; Tokeman 1992).  Third, businesses 
that were capitalized with a loan from a bank are labeled in the formal sector, because banks will 
often not lend to informal businesses “due to the risks associated with microenterprises” 
(Tokeman 1992, 66).  Conversely, businesses capitalized with loans from friends were labeled as 
informal.    
In this investigation, slight alterations were made to Tokeman’s (1992) criteria to make 
the differentiation more conservative in terms of informal businesses.   First, the labeling of type 
of business was considered.  I labeled street vendors as informal and all of the other businesses 
were determined based on an adaptation of Tokeman’s (1992) other criteria.  Tokeman (1992), 
suggested that the second alteration was in the number of workers employed.  He specified that 
businesses with fewer than 15 workers are most often informal, but in this research the criterion 
was set at 5.  Third, although Tokeman (1992) stressed the importance of family labor, the 
criteria I employed stated that the number of workers was more important.  So if the business had 
over 5 workers, all in the family, it was labeled as formal.  Tokeman (1992) also suggested that 
much of the manufacturing should be considered informal: however, this analysis only labeled 
street vendors as informal.  Despite the conservative differentiation, informal businesses made up 
the overwhelming majority, 919 compared to 185.  Previous research has indicated that informal 
businesses do make up the majority of businesses, specifically in urban Mexico (Arias et al. 
2010; Meril 1996), indicating the criteria established in this research are reasonable.  For the 
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majority of the criteria, more conservative categories were used. The entire set of criteria is 
presented below in Table 2.  
Table 2, Informal Business Differentiation Criteria  
Type Type of Business Labor 
Characteristics 
Method of 
Capitalization 
Number of 
Businesses (N)  
Total =1,104 
Formal Any More than 5 
workers 
Loan from bank 185 
Informal Street vendor Family Labor > 
Nonfamily 
Labor, 
Less than 5 
workers 
Loan from 
friends 
919 
 
As this analysis uses binary (event history) logistic modeling techniques, the groups are 
mutually exclusive. In other words, if the business fit any of the characteristics, it was considered 
informal.  In reality, businesses might switch from group to group and therefore not fit so neatly 
into one criterion.  However, I deemed this scheme to be the best method to differentiate between 
formal and informal businesses given the data as well as Tokeman’s classification scheme.  The 
next section will discuss the independent variables and what they are attempting to analyze.  To 
try to further examine the differences, multinomial models were used to examine the risks 
between businesses being formed in each respective sector.  
Household-Level Independent Variables 
 The following section will discuss the variables added, how they were coded, and their 
theoretical justification for inclusion in the model.  When analyzing how migration leads to 
business formation it becomes crucial to control for any previously attained capital.  Households 
with more capital should be more readily able to create a business; as such, two capital control 
variables were included.  More capital may be a result of the household being wealthier and/or 
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better acclimated to the financial system.  The first capital control variable is the presence of a 
property specifically dedicated to a business.  Most informal businesses are run out of the home 
or on the street where they do not need dedicated property (Tokeman 1992; Davis 2007).  
However, having a property may make them more likely to be formal due to their larger scale 
operations.  By including this variable in the subsequent models I am able to examine the 
relationship between business property ownership and formality and address the emphasis that 
some theorists, including De Soto (2003), have put on this relationship. The figures in Table 3 
demonstrate that not many households actually own properties for businesses, but I hypothesize 
that all of the households that own a property for their business will be located in the formal 
economy.  
Table 3, Number of Business Properties for Mexican Households 1980-2010. 
Number of Properties Frequency 
0 91,247 
1 214 
2 7 
Source: Mexican Migration Project 
The second capital control variable is the number of house properties owned by the 
household.  Owning more houses obviously demonstrates more acquired capital and wealth.  A 
better measurement may have been rooms in the house, as migrants often spend their 
migradollars on room additions upon return to the homeland (Massey and Parrado 1994).  
However, despite having that data in the MMP, the variable was not designated with reference to 
time and thus precludes a determination of when the rooms were added in relation to either 
migration or business formation.  As demonstrated below in Table 4, there was substantial 
variation between the numbers of properties owned, as some households owned up to five 
properties for housing.  The business and house properties were coded by time, so the data could 
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be examined for number of properties over time.  Having the number of businesses and house 
properties change over time combats the problem of endogeneity.  If properties did not vary by 
time, the relationship between capital and business formation would be endogenous, making it 
impossible to tell if the capital was leading to businesses or the businesses were leading to more 
capital. By using time varying data, I can distinguish whether the additional properties are 
bought prior to the formation of a business.  In summary, through the inclusion of the number of 
household properties and business properties I am better able to control for capital attained prior 
to business formation. 
Table 4. Number of Housing Properties for Mexicans from 1980 to 2010. 
Number of Housing Properties Frequency 
0 90,112 
1 1,194 
2 129 
3 15 
4 15 
5 3 
Source: Mexican Migration Project 
Although the previous two variables controlled for capital, the next three variables are 
more important, allowing the examination of how household-level characteristics influence 
business formation. First, to examine how household characteristics are associated with business 
formation, I included the age of the household head.  Age of household head serves as a proxy 
measurement for stage in the lifecycle of the household.  It is important to examine when in the 
life cycle households are forming business and how it relates to migration timing.  The head’s 
age serves as the best proxy measurement for life cycle, as it is strongly associated with other life 
cycle variables such the number and ages of children as well as spouse age.  The age variable 
makes it possible to examine how age of the head is related to business formation.   Second, I 
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examine the average education achieved by the members of the household. Education has been 
demonstrated across migration corridors as a significant predictor of business formation.  Instead 
of looking just at the head’s attainment, I include a variable representing the education of all 
members, averaging the years of education by member while controlling for age.  Including this 
variable allows for comparison between models to see the influence of household-level education 
on the type of business formed.  The final household-level characteristic included were dummy 
variables for each respective age group.  Some previous research has indicated that informal 
businesses are especially inclined to use household labor, specifically the work of children 
(Tokeman 1992).  Yet the presence of children in the family may also hinder the development of 
a large-scale business, making it worthwhile to determine the association between presence and 
age of children and the creation of both formal and informal businesses.   
Plotting the hazard function of the average household education, demonstrates how 
important education is between formal and informal businesses.   Figure 1 below demonstrates 
the influence of education on informal businesses.  Education seems to have a linear relationship 
with informal business creation, as each year increases the probability of starting a business.  For 
formal business, it becomes how important education is, as the probability of starting a business 
increases dramatically, especially for the households with the highest levels of educational 
attainment (specifically university or 15+ years).  The hazard increases dramatically for 
households that have the highest levels of education, while for informal businesses the 
relationship is more linear and even drops off with a high amount of earned education.  It is 
important to note that this relationship controls for age by using the average number of years of 
everyone in the household. 
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Figure 1. Average Household Education Hazard Function and Informal Business Creation 
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Figure 2. Average Household Education Hazard Function and Formal Business Creation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the objective of this analysis is to study the influence of migration on business 
formation, two migration dummy variables are included.  The first variable is whether or not the 
head was currently in the United States.  In years that the head was in the US, the years are coded 
as 1.  When the head was at home, the years are coded as 0.  This variable serves as a proxy 
measurement for the household receiving remittances, as the head in particular has been 
demonstrated to overwhelmingly send remittances (Massey and Parrado 1994; Massey, Durrand 
and Pren 2010).  By including this variable, I am analyzing the influence of remittances on 
business formation, and specifically whether remittances help create businesses (specifically 
formal or informal).  Moreover, it measures how migration by the head might limit or facilitate 
business formation by the household in Mexico.  A major limitation of this particular variable is 
the yearly scale.  Often migration is only temporary or seasonal: however, for the case of this 
analysis, even a one month or three month migration is generalized as a yearlong migration.  In 
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the future, a finer resolution on duration of migration could improve the veracity of the analysis.   
Of the 91,159 household years, the head was engaged in migration in 3,564 of the, roughly 4% 
of the entire analysis. 
Rather than examining current migration, the second dummy variable for migrant status 
focuses on the household head’s, international migration experience.  Before migration, and even 
while the head is in the United States, the variable is coded as a 0, whereas upon return from 
migration and until censoring the head has a value of 1.  If the head returns to Mexico and then 
migrates again to the United States the value goes to 0 during migration and then 1 upon return.  
This variable serves as a proxy measurement for the influence of migration, specifically return 
migration on business formation.  Implicit in this thesis is the recognition that there are numerous 
factors that help migrants to create a business upon their return.   Previous literature has 
demonstrated that return migration is much more important to business formation than are 
remittances, and I would anticipate this trend continuing; however, remittances may be used 
more often to start informal than formal businesses.  It is also important to note that the head’s 
migration experience is centered, this makes the cross level interaction term easier to interpret.   
One major limitation of this variable is that it does not weight the years closest to return.   In the 
future, it would be interesting to weight more heavily the years closest to the return to see when 
migrants are starting businesses in relation to their return.   Of the 91,468 household years, the 
head had returned for 7,313 years or 12.51% of all household years. 
In event history analysis, it is crucial that the data vary accurately by time. All these 
variables were coded to vary over time in accordance with their recollection of yearly events.  
When the children were in school, the average educational attainment changed accordingly.  By 
using the birth year of the children, they moved through the different age groups as the years 
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changed.  Finally, every year one year is added to the household head’s age.   Although the 
household variables are important, recent research has indicated the importance of community-
level factors on migradollar usage and business formation.  Their interaction may be the most 
important aspect of this research.  
Community-Level Data 
Increasingly, researchers stress the importance of the contextual community level for 
migration decisions and use of migradollars (Lindstrom 1996; Riosmena 2009; White and 
Lindstrom 2006).  In addition, Massey and Parrado (1998) concluded that communities with 
better economies generally saw the formation of more businesses.  For more information 
regarding the importance of the contextual community-level variables, see the section above 
regarding the community influences on migradollar usage. Massey and Parrado (1998) also 
concluded that national economic factors such as inflation matter for business creation. The 
analysis of this research does not include national level data; however, it contains four 
community-level variables as well as a cross-level interaction term between a community-level 
variable and a household-level variable. 
Unlike the household-level data, which are from the MMP, the community-level data 
come from the Mexican Census (INEGI). In this investigation, the census data have been merged 
with the household file.  However, the Mexican census is only taken every ten years, for which 
Ito assume monotonic growth from decade to decade.  In Mexico, during the period of analysis, 
these indicators were fluid and dynamic, fluctuating dramatically from year to year and in some 
cases from month to month. Unfortunately, I lacked more precise temporal data that would 
capture these fluctuations.  Another major limitation of linking the households with the 
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community-level data is the source did not take into account internal migration.  The households 
in the community in which the interview took place were linked to that respective community, 
even if they were recent migrants to the area and had previously lived in another community.  
This supposition of residential stability is obviously a flawed assumption, especially if 
respondents were drawn from rural areas to more economically dynamic urban ones.  Moreover, 
if they started a business in their previous community, it would be attributed to the community 
where the survey was taken. Although not having data regarding the community in which 
households previously lived is a substantial limitation, there simply were no data regarding past 
communities of residence.  Despite these two major limitations regarding community-level 
variables, the benefits of understanding how the economic context matters in terms of which 
types of businesses are formed is significant.  Four community variables are included, and their 
importance will be discussed below. Their respective descriptive statistics are also presented 
after they have been explained in table 4 below. 
The first community-level variable included is female labor force participation.  
Lindstrom (1996) used this measure to analyze the economic conditions of the community of 
origin.  He asserted that a higher proportion of female employment is indicative of better 
economic conditions.  Similarly, according to Jafee (2007), females in less economically 
advantaged communities rely on remittances for basic living expenses, whereas those from 
economically vibrant communities are more likely to work in the labor force rather than simply 
live off of remittances.  Even in communities that are highly dependent on male migration and 
remittances, female labor force participation remains an excellent proxy measurement for the 
economic conditions of the community.     
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As female labor force is a proxy measurement for economic conditions of the community 
of origin, I measured community-level migration dependence by the proportion of the male 
migrants in the community.  Obviously, communities more engaged in migration would have a 
higher proportion of male migrants.  Data on the female migration ratio did exist, and it was 
highly correlated with both the male migrant ratio and the female labor force participation 
variables.  As the majority of the migrants from Mexico are male, it should be an acceptable 
variable to quantify community-level migration dependence.  Similarly, more male migrants 
should indicate greater flows and greater dependence on remittances as a community.  Thus, the 
variable serves as a way to measure both community-level migration and the influence of 
remittances.  The average proportion of male migrants for all the urban areas was 18%.  In other 
words, roughly one in five Mexican urban men have migrated during the census period.  Like the 
other measures, tremendous variance existed as the minimum value was 0 and the maximum was 
almost 70% (see the descriptive statistics below).  Clearly, some communities are more 
dependent on migration than others, and the community-level influence of migration on business 
formation needs to be explored. 
To assess community-level prevalence of informality, I included the community-level 
variable of self-employment.  Higher levels of self-employment indicate a greater degree of 
community-level informality.  A high proportion of informality could have two possible 
divergent effects.  First, the market could be saturated with businesses, not allowing for new 
businesses, or when new businesses are started, are short lived due to the substantial competition. 
Davis (2007) espouses this theory.   Another possible effect of a large informal sector would 
facilitate new businesses.  Just like the theory of cumulative causation suggests with migration, 
households could see their peers start a business and make money.  Viewing their success, the 
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household would then attempt to form their own business.  Migration might be interrelated with 
this process, in that when the household views another engage in migration, gain capital, start a 
small informal business, the household aspires to similar upward social mobility.    
 In addition, the proportion of self-employed allows an analysis of which communities are 
already more informal and how this proportion influences formal business creation.  Some 
migration theorists have suggested that formal businesses often cannot compete with a large 
informal sector where the prices and labor are cheaper.  By including this variable, I am able to 
examine the influence of a prevalent informal sector on the creation of a formal business.  
Finally, this variable serves as a proxy measurement of which communities have been most 
substantially influenced by the reforms of neoliberalism, which forced many citizens into the 
informal sector.  Tremendous variance exists within the proportion of self-employed, as the 
minimum community has only 8% while the maximum has almost 60%, with the average being 
around 25% (see Table 4 below).  The analysis helps to address the question of whether 
migration is a means of overcoming capital constraints and culminating in the formation of an 
informal business in a market with many informal businesses. 
 The final community-level variable included in this analysis is the proportion of large-
scale business owners in the community.  Like the self-employment variable, this proportion 
does not explicitly indicate whether or not businesses are in the formal or informal sector: 
however, the owner business variable most likely indicates ownership of a formal business.  
Thus, it serves as a measure of the strength and prevalence of the formal economy in the 
respective community.  As demonstrated below in Table 5, formal business owners make up 
incredibly small proportions of the community in terms of population, with the average at just 
2.5%, with the largest proportion at 6.6%.   Despite the low overall community proportions, 
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more owners could have a multiplicative effect on formal labor.  More formal ownership 
indicates a greater number of people working for formal businesses in the community.   
Surprisingly, community-level ownership is not highly correlated with the self-employed 
variable, and both can be included without problems related to multicollinearity.  However, they 
are both indicative of community-level entrepreneurship.   Having a variable to measure the 
formal sector is important to contrast with the informal proportion of workers.  The inclusion of 
the variable helps to address the question of whether the presence of more formal businesses in 
communities is associated with a higher proportion of people that work in the formal sector and 
whether this variable is associated with other economic measures. 
All four measures provide specific community-level information that are worth 
examination, especially in relation to business formation and sector.   The descriptive statistics 
for all four community level measures are demonstrated below in Table 5. 
 
 
 
Methods: 
As mentioned before, the MMP data are retrospective in nature. The period of 
observation is restricted to the 25 years prior to the survey to minimize recall bias by the 
Table 5. Mexican Community Level Proportions, 1980-2010
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Female Labor Force 23.7 8.8 7.0 40.7
Male Migrant 18.4 12.8 0.0 69.1
Self Employed (Informal proxy) 25.2 10.4 9.0 59.2
Owner  (Formal proxy) 2.4 1.2 0.3 6.6
Source: Mexican Census
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interviewee.  Additionally, the period of observation is restricted to the year of formation of the 
household head’s current union (if this is more recent than the 25 year limited observation) as the 
business formation history is supposed to pertain to the sampled household.  Because I am 
attempting to examine the influence of migration on the business formation, I need to include 
time.  Obviously the migration would need to occur before the business was formed to increase 
the likelihood of establishing causality.  According to Bhrolchain and Dyson (2007), temporal 
ordering is a crucial aspect in asserting causality.   The data used has year of business formation 
and no additional temporal gradations.  Due to this rather crude temporal scale, this analysis will 
use discrete event history analysis (by way of logistic regression) rather than continuous-time 
proportional hazards models.   Other aspects of the data set support the use of the discrete event 
history analysis. The other time varying variables are represented by year and are not on a finer 
continuous measurement. Given the temporal scale of this investigation, discrete modeling is 
arguably the best technique (Singer and Willet 2003; 313).  According to Singer and Willet 
(2003; 371) the objective of discrete event history analysis asks: “What is the relationship 
between the risk of the event [business formation] occurrence in each time period and 
predictor?” 
 Since the data are coded in a discrete time model, basic logistic modeling techniques can 
be employed (Yamaguchi 1991, 19).  Logistic regression measures binary outcomes, in this case 
whether or not a business is formed each year.  As discussed previously, the year for the 
dependent variables are coded as t + 1, with 1 if the business is actually formed and 0 if a 
business is not formed.  If a business is formed, the household is then censored.  In addition to 
the censoring employed, censoring also occurred at the year of survey even if the household did 
not start a business during the time the data were collected.  The majority of the population did 
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not start a business, or some may have started the business after the survey.  Out of the 91,159 
household years, businesses were formed in 1,104 years or 1.2% of all household years.  Those 
who did not start a business were censored at the year of the survey according to the process 
outlined by Singer and Willet (2003; 317).    When the data are censored because the event did 
not occur, or the household did not form a business, it is known as right censoring.  As discussed 
previously, a distinct start date was given which for the most part prevented any issues associated 
with left censoring.   Although censoring may lead to some modeling problems, Singer and 
Willet (2003; 318) assert: “in research on event occurrence: censoring is inevitable.”   
 The dependent variable, type of business formed, is a binary outcome, which is perfect 
for both event history analysis and consequently logistic regression.  In event history analysis, 
logistic regression is used to estimate the probability of the hazard occurring.  For this analysis, 
the probability of a business being formed is known as the “hazard.”  The upper and lower 
bounds of the hazard are 0 and 1, and with logistic regression techniques, the results are in 
conditional probabilities, or the probability that the event or hazard has occurred (Singer and 
Willet 2003; 364).  Only looking at the probability or odds can often be problematic: however, 
using the logit transformation fixes all the problems associated with considering probability 
alone.  The logit transformation also makes the distance between values more comparable over 
time, making values similar and allowing modeling of time varying data (Singer and Willet 
2003; 365).   Finally, the logit transformation is necessary for logistic regression as it transforms 
binary data into a normal distribution. 
 Instead of simple event-history logistic regression techniques, as seen in Massey and 
Parrado (1998) this analysis uses multilevel modeling techniques.  Multilevel modeling 
techniques were employed for empirical, theoretical, and statistical reasons.  Including both 
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community and household-level variables makes the analysis more robust to both ecological 
fallacies and atomistic fallacies.  In addition to avoiding critical ecological fallacies, multilevel 
modeling was employed for theoretical reasons, the following paragraph will explain why the 
previous research stresses the implementation of multilevel techniques.  Previous research has 
stressed the importance of community-level factors to business creation (see above).  Previous 
qualitative and quantitative research has indicated that communities with strong economies are 
more likely to see migrants start businesses than communities with weaker economies.  This 
research attempts to examine specific community level economic and social factors and examine 
how they influence the distinction between formal and informal businesses.  These community 
level factors are included in addition to the household level variables. 
Theoretical reasons are not insufficient to employ multilevel modeling.  However 
relatively, high Median Odds Ratios provide one statistical justification for employing multilevel 
modeling. The Median Odds Ratio (MOR) is the equivalent of the intra-class correlation 
coefficient (ICC) for Ordinary Least Square multilevel models for multilevel logistic models.  
According to (Merlo et al. 2006, 263): “The MOR can be conceptualized as the increased risk 
that (in median) would have if moving to another area with a higher risk.”  The closer to 1, the 
lower the difference in communities, a value of 1.44 indicates relatively large community 
differences and more importantly that multilevel logistic modeling is methodologically an 
appropriate technique to be employed for the subsequent analysis. Table 5 below depicts the 
calculation of the MOR with the community level variance of the null model.  According to 
Merlo et al. (2006) the null model is used to calculate the MOR.  The relatively high MOR for all 
the dependent variables suggests that considerable variation exists between communities in terms 
of business creation.  The high MOR values, and considerable variation between the dependent 
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variables between communities provide empirical reasons for the implementation of multilevel 
modeling.  Finally, the equation for the MOR, based on the equation from Merlo et al. 92006) is 
demonstrated below. 
Median Odds Ratio Formula: EXP(SQRT(2*community level variance )*0.6745) 
Table 6, Median Odds Ratio by Business Type (calculated with the null model): 
Dependent Variable Median Odds Ratio Value 
Informal Business 1.44 
Formal Business 1.44 
Any Business 1.41 
  
Another major statistical justification of implementing multilevel modeling techniques is 
the data structure of the data used in this analysis.  The MMP data are “nested,” in different 
communities.  As demonstrated by the MOR, households in the same communities are more 
similar to one another than households from different communities, especially when it comes to 
business formation.  For example, it would be a safe assumption that a Mexican migrant from a 
small community is more similar to someone in their community compared to someone from a 
larger community.  These intra-community similarities lead to problems with “the structural 
properties of the data” (Luke 2004; 21).  Nested data violates a major assumption of traditional 
models, that the observations and error terms are independent (Luke 2004; 21).   When level two 
variables are included, the observations are no longer independent as their level two variables are 
the exact same if they are from the same community.  Also, the observations are similar to one 
another when they are from the same community. When observations are “nested,” there is a 
strong possibility that the independent observation assumption is violated, creating correlated 
errors.   These correlated errors can decrease the standard errors, leading to an increased 
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probability of committing a Type One Error (Luke 2004; 22).  Multilevel models relax this 
assumption allowing for more accurate and robust models, by not punishing correlated errors 
(Luke 2004; 22).  Massey and Parrado (1998) did not use multilevel modeling techniques despite 
their nested data which may have biased their results.  Using multilevel modeling techniques in 
addition to event history analysis is a substantial methodological improvement over their 1998 
study for methodological and theoretical reasons. 
Because the subsequent models are logistic, they are considered generalized hierarchical 
linear models (generalized multilevel models).  Just as for event history analysis, for binary 
outcomes in multilevel modeling, the data must be transformed using the logit link function.  
When the logit transformation is employed, the density of the predicted probability becomes 
close to a normal distribution, allowing for modeling.  In multilevel modeling, the link function 
is known as the canonical link function (Luke 2004; 55).   One major limitation of this 
transformation is that level one variance is determined by the population mean and cannot be 
estimated (Luke 2004;54).  The inability to estimate the mean makes it impossible to estimate the 
Intra Class Correlation, although the MOR is a suitable alternative (Merlo et al. 2006).  Now that 
the general framework and methodological justifications for multilevel discrete event history 
analysis has been discussed, I will discuss each model employed in the order that is used in the 
following analysis.  
The logit transformation is on the left of the equation demonstrated below, as all the data 
must go through this transformation (Singer and Willet 2003; 371).  T is the conditional 
probability of business formation contingent on still being in the sample at that point.  Xi is the 
risk associated with the values at the respective time. On the right there, are two groups. The first 
a values represent the hazard in the particular time period (Singer and Willet 2003; 371).  The 
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second parameters, or b values, are the typical regression covariates.  However, since I am using 
multilevel modeling techniques, the equation must be slightly modified.  As demonstrated below 
for the multilevel event history analysis, an additional term is included, random effects at the 
second or community level (jt).  It also assumes that the level one (b) coefficients are fixed 
effects.  In the subsequent paragraphs I will justify my implementation of multilevel modeling 
and further discuss the modeling techniques employed. 
  ijtijtititijtj XXXX +++=)(logit ijt  
Three types of generalized multilevel models are employed in this analysis.  The first 
type of model employed is the unconstrained or the null model.  The null model which is used to 
calculate the ICC or MOR contains no level one or level two predictors.  In addition to 
calculating the ICC or MOR, it also sets the foundation for more complex modeling and the 
inclusion of level one and level two predictors (Luke 2004; 13).  
The second type of model employed is known as a random intercepts model.  It only 
includes level one predictors, in this case household-level variables.  This model allows the 
researcher to examine the influence of the relationships between the level one variables and the 
dependent variable.   However, unlike in traditional models, random intercepts models: “assume 
that level-1 intercepts vary across level-2 units, but not the level-1 slopes” (Luke 2004; 14).   For 
logit multilevel models, there is no level one error term; in essence the first level model only 
calculates the intercept, which is the average probability of business formation for each variable 
(Luke 2004; 57).  The random effect is the variability of business formation across all 
households (Luke 2004; 56). 
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The third and final type of model is employed for the final two models; it includes level 
two terms or community level data.  Furthermore, it has a random slope in addition to random 
intercepts.  Unlike the other two types of models employed above, it assumes that intercepts vary 
across level two units. (Luke 2004; 15).   I use this type of model when I include the community-
level variables as well as the cross level interaction term.  When the cross-level interaction term 
is added, the slopes become random as well.  As discussed above the objective of including the 
cross level interaction term is to examine the influence of migration on a strong established 
formal sector, two divergent effects.   For emphasis, the final two multilevel models that I 
include had both random effects.   I include a cross-level interaction term in the random effects 
model to see what the influence of an established formal sector is on migration status. 
Allowing slopes to vary across level-2 units facilitates the key differences and aspect of 
multilevel modeling and reflects the idea that intercepts and slopes are outcomes of level-2 
predictors.   Another important aspect of multilevel modeling is that it is comprised of both 
random and fixed effects.  In multilevel modeling, random effects are similar to error terms in 
other modeling techniques; however, they have two sources of variability as they are tied to both 
level one and level two variables (Luke 2004; 9). 
The final type of modeling employed in this thesis is multinomial or competing risk 
modeling.  Multinomial modeling allows the researcher to examine the competing risks of 
business formation.  I can directly examine which factors predict business formation and the 
differentiation between business type.  They allow me to analyze which factors are most 
important in differentiating between formal and informal business creation. 
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Like any methodology, there are some major limitations with the analysis employed 
below and the methods selected.  First, I have not seen many multilevel event history analyses in 
the literature and I am not sure how statistically sound the modeling techniques are.  
Nevertheless Henry, Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2004) used event history analysis and 
multilevel modeling.   The second limitation of this analysis was the ratio of events to person 
years.  Slightly over 900 informal businesses were formed in over 91,000 person year’s worth of 
data, with this imbalance making it difficult to find predictors and have robust models 
specifically for formal business creation models.   
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In this chapter I describe and discuss the results of the models employed in this analysis.  
Three sets of models are presented.  First, I examine the results of the multilevel models that 
predict informal business creation.  Second, I review the results of the models that predict formal 
business creation.  Third, I examine the results of the multinomial competing risk models, which 
further differentiate between formal and informal businesses and the variables associated with 
each respective business type. Finally, I discuss the overall results of the project and the 
implications for relevant literature.  
Informal Business Models 
To briefly review, the processes in traditional multilevel modeling four models were 
computed (Zhao and Cao 2010).  First, the null model was run to provide the MOR (or ICC) as 
well as to set the foundation for future more complex modeling.  Second, household-level 
variables were included in the model with random effects.   Third, community-level variables 
were added to the random effects models.  Fourth, a cross-level interaction term was added.  The 
results of each model are examined in turn and are demonstrated in Table 7. 
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 The null model demonstrates the MOR of 1.44, which as discussed above, justifies 
statistically the implementation of multilevel modeling.  Additionally, it sets the foundation for 
comparison between future models.  Two variables were used for model evaluation.   The logged 
likelihood of the null value is -5111.   
 The second model used random intercepts, but only included household-level variables.   
The importance of previous capital becomes apparent.  Both capital-control variables had strong 
Table 7. Multi-Level-Event History Analysis, Informal Business Models
Odds Ratios
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Household Level
Migratory Experience
  Head Abroad 0.83 0.80 0.80
  Head Returned 1.85 *** 1.80 *** 1.73 ***
New Business Properties 3.33 ** 3.28 ** 3.31 **
New Housing Properties 1.67 *** 1.66 *** 1.65 ***
Head age 0.99 * 0.99 * 0.99 **
Average Household Education 1.05 *** 1.05 *** 1.05 ***
Dummy: Children from 0-4 0.68 ** 0.71 ** 0.71 **
Dummy: Children from 5-12 0.82 ** 0.83 * 0.84 **
Dummy: Children from 13-17 1.05 1.16 1.15
Community Level
Female Labor Force Participation 1.05 *** 1.05 ***
Proportion Of Adult Male U.S. Migrants 1.02 *** 1.02 ***
Owner Proportion 0.76 *** 0.76 ***
Self-Employed Proportion 1.02 * 1.01 *
Owner Proportion and 
  Migration Experience Interaction 1.18 *
Intercept 0.01 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Model Evaluation
Community Level Variance 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.16
Logged Likelihood -5111 -5026 -5013 -5002
Median Odds Ratio 1.44 1.42 1.42 1.41
† p < 0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <0.01 *** p < 0.001
Sources: Mexican Migration Project and INEGI
Notes: Model 1 is the null model.  Model 2 includes random effects on household level variabls.  Model 3
includes community level variables.  Model 4 includes the cross-level interaction term.
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positive associations with business formation.  Each additional housing property owned by the 
household multiplied the odds of informal business formation by a factor of 1.67.  Not 
surprisingly, owning a property specifically for a business had an even stronger association, as 
each additional property owned increased the odds of informal business formation by a factor of 
3.33.  Clearly, previous capital attainment is important to business formation. 
 In addition to controlling for previous economic capital, other household metrics were 
included.  To analyze the life cycle of the household, a proxy measure, the age of the head, was 
entered into the equation.  There was a relatively weak negative association with head age and 
informal business creation, each additional year older the head was, the odds decreased by about 
1%.  However, this measure assumes a linear relationship, when in reality the association may be 
closer to a quadratic one.  Future models should include an age-squared measure to see if the 
relationship is actually quadratic.  As some research has suggested the importance of young 
children in labor variables, the number of children was included.  The number of children in 
specifically young-age groups had a negative association with informal business formation.  This 
finding contradicts research that has asserted that young children can help facilitate businesses.  
This finding asserts that young children generally discourage business formation. 
 Household-level education had a positive association with business formation.   Each 
year of additional education increases the odds of business formation by a factor of 1.05.  For 
informal business creation, education seems to matter.  Figure 1 above further demonstrates this 
association, as a seemingly linear relationship exists between household level education and the 
probability of business formation.  This linear association will be contrasted with the relationship 
between education and formal business formation below. 
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 As the major objective of this research was to examine the relationship between 
migration and informal business formation, two migratory variables were included.  First, a 
variable that measures when the head is currently in the United States was included in the 
analysis.  This is a proxy measurement for the household receiving remittances, while also 
exploring the influence of the household head being away.  Despite the strong negative 
association, the relationship is not statistically significant.  The other migratory variable 
describes when the head has returned from migration.  Each year after the return was coded as 1.  
If they have yet to migrate, never migrated, or are away on migration, the household years were 
coded as 1.  A strong positive association becomes apparent between migrant experience and 
business formation.  Households where the head has migratory experience are almost twice as 
likely to form a business than households where the head has not migrated (1.85).  Migratory 
experience is important for business formation. When the household-level variables are 
controlled for, the community-level variance drops from.14 to.13.  The logged likelihood and 
AIC (not shown) both drop substantially, indicating improved model fit. 
 The third model includes community-level characteristics.  First I will describe the results 
of the community-level variables before briefly discussing their influence on the household-level 
variables.  Finally, I will examine the model diagnostic measures. 
 All of the community-level variables are statistically significant predictors of informal 
business formation.  This pattern of results is congruent with the increasing body of research that 
stresses the importance of community-level factors in both migradollar usage and business 
formation by migrants and non-migrants alike.  Female labor force participation has a relatively 
strong positive association with business formation.  Each additional percentage of females who 
work in the labor force increases the odds of business formation by roughly five percent.  
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Congruent with Lindstrom’s (1996) hypothesis, economically advantaged communities see more 
businesses formed as the migrants see greater returns on their investments.  However, future 
research should further examine the businesses success in these communities.   
Although having lots of females in the labor force participation has a strong association 
with business formation, the percentage of the community that owns their own formal business 
has an extremely strong negative association.  Each additional percentage of the community that 
owns their own formal business decreases the odds of informal business creation by roughly 
24%.  This might seem like an incredibly powerful relationship; however, the range is quite 
constrained (min:.23% max: 6.57%), leading to seemingly inflated odds ratios.  Nevertheless, the 
association remains, and communities with strong formal economies are more likely to see new 
informal businesses created within them.  This strong association needs further examination and 
will be combined with migratory experience in the final model. 
 In contrast to the strong association demonstrated by the formal economy proxy value, 
the informal proxy measure (self-employed), demonstrates a positive association.  Each 
additional percentage point of the economy that owns their informal business increases the odds 
of business formation by roughly 2%.  Communities with more established and prevalent 
informal economies seem to see more informal businesses created.  When the models were 
examined with a squared term to see if there was a point of saturation, the squared term was not 
statistically significant.  More businesses may create economies of scale, or integrate with one 
another, thereby facilitating other business formation.  
Although the weakest of all the community-level associations, having a higher proportion 
of migrants is associated with a higher likelihood of businesses formed.   For each additional one 
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percentage increase in males in the community with migration experience, the odds of starting an 
informal business increase by 2%.  Communities that are more engaged in migration may be 
more entrepreneurial to begin with, or migration could enhance the entrepreneurial nature 
through migration. Another likely (and congruent) explanation is that the economic multiplier 
effects of remittances lead to businesses being formed with an increase of funds flowing into the 
community.  One clear finding of this thesis is the clear association between migration and 
informal business formation.  Household and community-level migration experience both have 
relatively strong positive associations with informal business creation. 
Adding the community-level variables increases the model fit.  The logged likelihood 
increases from -5,026 to -5,013, demonstrating significant improvement in the fit of the model.  
In summary, increasing the community-level variables in the model makes the model more 
robust.  It is also important to note that when controlling for community-level variables, some of 
the household-level variables are altered slightly.   Specifically, the strength of the influence of 
migration decreases by 11%; however, it still remains substantial at 1.76.  Moreover, the 
association of owning a property specifically for a business is reduced by 5%.  All of the other 
changes to the variables are trivial. 
The final model for informal business creation includes a cross-level interaction term.  
Two of the strongest associations in the model were migration experience and the percentage of 
formal business owners in the community.  Additionally, one of my major research questions 
was how the influence of community-level factors influence informal business creation.   One 
aspect in particular worth examination is how a strong, prevalent formal economy would be 
influenced by migration experience.  After centering both variables, I created an interaction term 
between household migration experience and community-level formal business ownership.  The 
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new variable was then added to the model with the household level variables and the 
community-level variables. 
When added to the model, the cross-level interaction term between head migratory 
experience and community-level formal business ownership is strong and statistically significant.  
The positive association of the cross-level interaction term suggests that household-level 
migration in essence mitigates the influence of the negative association of a more prevalent 
formal economy.   Put another way, migrants are still likely to start a business in a community 
with a strong formal economy, especially compared to non-migrants.  Migrants are starting 
informal businesses even in communities with strong formal economies, while the non-migrant 
population would have a much lower probability of starting a business.  This relationship 
becomes further evident, as the odds of non-migrants starting an informal business in a 
community with 1% ownership is.76, but for migrants it is.89, 13% higher.  In summary, 
although an incredibly strong negative association exists between formal business creation and 
informal business creation, migration experience attenuates this negative relationship.  Migration 
experience is extremely important for informal business creation.  Figure 3 below further depicts 
this relationship.   It becomes apparent with the calculated predicted probabilities that migrants 
are more likely from the start to start a business and their slope does not decline as quickly as 
non-migrants.  In summary, migration experience makes a substantial difference for informal 
business creation, and households with migration experience are starting businesses in places 
where they most likely shouldn’t be. 
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Figure 3. Predicted Probabilities Comparing Informal Business Creation Between Migrant and 
Non-Migrant Households. 
 
Formal Business Models 
The formal business models are also presented below in Table 8.  Due to the rare 
occurrence of formal businesses (105 in over 91,000 household years), fewer variables were 
statistically significant, even with the p-value extended to 0.1.   I will not examine these models 
as thoroughly as the informal business models, but rather I will discuss some of the key findings 
within the models.  One of the major findings in the models is the exceptionally strong 
relationship between owning a property for a business and then starting a formal one.  Each 
additional property owned specifically for a business multiplies the odds of business formation 
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by a factor of 9.74.  It seems that households purchase land for businesses before they start their 
formal businesses.  Although this relationship is mitigated when community-level variables are 
controlled for as the association declines by over 100%.   Another key result is the strong 
association between household educational attainment and formal business formation.  Each 
additional year of education in the household multiplies the odds of business formation by a 
factor of 1.19. When community-level variables are controlled for, the relationship is 
strengthened by roughly one percent.   Of all the household-level variables in any of the models, 
education is the only one whose association increases when community-level factors are 
controlled for. Congruent with informal business formation, migratory experience is associated 
with increased odds of formal business creation.  In households where the head has migratory 
experience, the odds are multiplied by a factor of 1.82.  But, when community-level 
characteristics are controlled for, the effect of head migratory experience drops by 17% to 1.65.   
The household factors were less able to predict formal business formation; however the capital 
control variable, education, and migratory experience still had relatively strong positive 
associations with formal business formation. 
Unlike informal businesses, formal businesses seem to be less dependent on the 
economic and social characteristics of their community.  The only community characteristic that 
predicted formal business creation is the proportion of males in the community with migratory 
experience.  Each additional percentage point of males with migration experience multiplies the 
odds of formal business formation by a factor of 1.01.  Once again, migration at both the 
household and community level is beneficial for business formation.  It is interesting to note that 
neither of the proxy measurements for strength of the formal or informal economy is statistically 
significant predictors for formal business creation in the communities.  Finally, the cross-level 
 
 
95 
 
interaction term is not statistically significant and does not warrant further discussion; moreover 
the cross level interaction decreased model fit. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Multi-Level-Event History Analysis, Formal  Business Models
Odds Ratios
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Household Level
Migratory Experience
  Head Abroad 0.43 0.38 0.40
  Head Returned 1.82 ** 1.65 * 1.62 *
New Business Properties 9.74 *** 8.71 *** 8.79 ***
New Housing Properties 0.48 0.46 0.46
Head age 0.98 ** 0.98 ** 0.98 **
Average Household Education 1.19 *** 1.20 *** 1.20 ***
Dummy Children from 0-4 0.69 0.67 0.68
Dummy Children from 5-12 0.94 0.93 0.93
Dummy Children from 13-17 0.67 0.66 0.66
Community Level
Female Labor Force Participation 0.98 0.98
Proportion Of Adult Male U.S. Migrants 1.01 * 1.01 †
Owner Proportion 0.95 0.94
Self-Employed Proportion 0.99 0.99
Owner Proportion and 
  Migration Experience Interaction 1.21
Intercept 0.01 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Model Evaluation
Community Level Variance 0.09 0.06 0.00 0
Logged Likelihood -1331 -1255 -1251 -1250
Median Odds Ratio 1.44 1.26 1.01 1
† p < 0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <0.01 *** p < 0.001
Sources: Mexican Migration Project and INEGI
Notes: Model 1 is the null model.  Model 2 includes random effects on household level variabls.  
Model 3  includes community level variables.  Model 4 includes the cross level interaction term.
The Logged likelihood increased by less than one from Model 3 to Model 4.
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Competing Risk Models 
 To further explore the differences in predictors between formal and informal business 
creation, multinomial or competing risk models I employed.  Multinomial modeling allows the 
comparison between distinct groups.  In this case, starting an informal business was compared to 
a formal one.  All the observations in these models had started a business; however, through 
multinomial modeling, I am able to examine which factors predict involvement in each sector 
relative to the other. The same household and community-level variables as in the multinomial 
models were included, except for the cross-level interaction term, which was removed.  The 
results of the multinomial model (or competing risk model) demonstrate the odds of starting an 
informal business relative to starting a formal business.  They are demonstrated in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Multinomial Model with Informal Business Set 
as Base Outcome Relative to Formal Business Creation 
Household Level
Migratory Experience
  Head Abroad 1.09
  Head Returned 1.95
New Business Properties 0.32 *
New Housing Properties 3.63 †
Head age 1.01
Average Household Education 0.88 ***
Dummy Children from 0-4 1.01
Dummy Children from 5-12 0.87
Dummy Children from 13-17 1.71 †
Community Level
Female Labor Force Participation 1.05 **
 Male U.S. Migrants 1.00
Owner Proportion 0.86
Self-Employed Proportion 1.02
† p < 0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <0.01 *** p < 0.001
Sources: Mexican Migration Project and INEGI
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 One of the more interesting findings in the competing-risk models has to do with the 
divergent relationships of the capital-control variables.  Each additional increase in housing 
properties multiplies the odds of starting an informal business relative to a formal one by a factor 
of 3.63.  Conversely, each additional business property decreases the odds of being in the 
informal economy relative to the formal economy by 68%.  As apparent from the above 
multilevel models, owning a property for a business has a tremendously strong association with 
formal business creation.  Additionally, previous literature has demonstrated that some informal 
businesses are run out of the household’s house, which becomes apparent in the multinomial 
models. The only other household-level variable that was statistically significant was household-
level educational attainment.  Each additional year of average household level education 
decreases the odds of starting an informal business relative to a formal one by 12%.  Not 
surprisingly, the more educated individuals are starting formal businesses.  Also, as suggested in 
some literature such as Davis (2007) households do seem to be using older children as labor in 
informal businesses.  Families which have a child aged 13-17 are almost twice as likely to start 
an informal business (1.72) relative to a formal business.  It would seem that households are 
using their children as labor. Finally, it is important to note that migrants were not more likely to 
start businesses in either sector, despite being more likely to start a business relative to non-
migrants. 
 The only community-level variable with a significant relationship was female labor force 
participation.   Each additional percentage point of females engaged in the labor force increases 
the odds of starting an informal business relative to a formal one by 4.5%.   This relationship is 
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fairly intuitive, as females are often more likely to work in the informal economy, so businesses 
started could use their labor.  Business owners could see a workforce, then start a business, 
knowing they would be able to find employable labor.  Additionally, the proportion of people 
engaged in the informal sector is almost significant at the 0.1 level.   Again, it demonstrates a 
slight positive association; however it is barley insignificant.  
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Chapter VII 
Discussion 
This research has contributed to the growing body of literature demonstrating a positive 
influence of migration on business formation.  This section will describe the key findings of this 
research.  First although there have been similar studies analyzing the influence of migration on 
business formation in Mexico (Massey and Parrado 1998),  the analysis of these investigations 
used event history analysis and as such their data was nested within communities, leading to 
potential type one errors by minimizing standard errors (Luke 2004). 
  In addition to methodological improvements over past research regarding business 
formation, this research has helped to further describe the relationship between migration and the 
proliferation of informality in Mexico.  International migrants from Mexico have seemed to use 
migration as a method to accumulate enough capital to start a business.  Congruent with the new 
economics of labor migration perspective, migration has been a means of overcoming both 
community-level market constraints and failures.   This research has also added to the theoretical 
perspective of the new economics of labor migration.  Specifically, this thesis has stressed 
community level factors and how they relate to business formation.  When households see 
community level economic opportunity they are more inclined to migrate for longer durations so 
that they can acquire enough capital to start a business.  While the NELM theoretical perspective 
stresses migration as a means to overcome capital constraints, it does not discuss motivation.  
This thesis has illustrated that those from more economically prosperous would be more likely to 
start a business than communities with poorer communities.  This may also explain how some 
communities become so dependent on remittances, a process that has become known as “migrant 
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syndrome.”  The communities where businesses are started are most likely better off 
economically and socially.  This process creates positive feedbacks for both types of the 
communities.  The communities that are better off are more likely to see migradollars invested in 
businesses while those that are worse off do not see businesses started and become increasingly 
dependent on migradollars economically and socially. 
  For both types of communities the businesses created seem to be overwhelmingly in the 
informal sector (see the descriptive statistics).  That is not to say that migrants are only starting 
informal businesses, but through migration Mexicans are able to gain the capital, which has 
facilitated business formation and subsequently the proliferation of urban informality.  The 
majority of Mexicans work in the informal sector, and after the economic restructuring of 
neoliberalism, it would seem that many used migration to gain capital to invest in businesses.   
Even in communities where the barriers to business formation are seemingly the highest (those 
with large established formal sectors), migrants are more likely than non-migrants to start 
informal businesses. 
Community-level migration is also beneficial for the creation and perpetuation of 
businesses.  Communities with higher migration were more likely to see informal and formal 
businesses.  In fact, community-level migration was the only community-level variable 
associated with business formation.  Migration experience remains a strong predictor of business 
formation at the community and household level.  The economic multiplier effects associated 
with remittances also seem to allow the perpetuation of the businesses.  When communities 
become inundated with remittances, they may become increasingly dependent on remittances; 
although, they also may see a economic shift toward business creation, even if the majority of the 
remittances are spent “unproductively.”  Migration seems to be driving the formation of 
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numerous businesses; however, the influence these businesses have on economic development 
remains unclear. 
Community-level demographic and economic characteristics are seemingly more 
important for informal than formal businesses.  Lindstrom (1996) suggested that migrants from 
better economic communities have longer durations to gather savings; this research has asserted 
that they in turn are most likely starting informal businesses.   The people starting informal 
businesses seem more likely to examine market conditions before they start their business, 
whereas the formal business owners will start them regardless of community-level conditions.   
However, it is also important to note that the community level variables were not as important to 
formal businesses as informal businesses.   One relationship that was found was that the size of 
the city mattered.  In larger cities formal businesses were more likely to be created.  But, due to 
issues with multicollinerity I left the magnitude of the city out of the models to prioritize the 
community level social and demographic characteristics.  Perhaps an additional reason why the 
community level characteristics were not significant is because formal businesses were a 
relatively rare event, so it could also be an issue of magnitude.  In summary, community-level 
characteristics seem to be more important for informal businesses than formal businesses, but 
this relationship could simply be an issue of modeling and not an exact pattern on the ground. 
 Another interesting finding is that communities with larger informal sectors are more 
likely to see more informal businesses.  As demonstrated by past research (see above), workers 
in the informal sector are more likely to work together, integrating with one another and creating 
economies of scale.  Instead of the almost “Darwinian” competition for survival, the strong stay 
in business the weak fold asserted by Davis (2007), we see communities cooperate economically. 
The opposite is also true of communities with stronger formal economies, where a strong 
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negative association exists.   In these communities with an established formal sector it seems 
difficult for the informal businesses to compete with the larger businesses.  In summary, the 
community-level economic conditions are more important for informal, small-scale businesses 
than for large businesses. 
Whereas informal businesses seem dependent on community-level factors, the 
households that start formal businesses are most likely to be from higher SES backgrounds, 
better educated and wealthier, with more capital before they even form their business.  More 
simply, the rich are starting businesses in the formal sector, whereas the poor or middle class are 
starting informal businesses.   The dichotomy between the informal and formal sector parallels 
the increasing inequality seen in Mexico. Migration in general does not seem to attenuate 
inequality through business formation, as the poorer households typically do not start large 
businesses, but they are still entrepreneurial and businesses can elevate their economic status.  
Additionally, we only have the business information at the year of the survey, so it could have 
grown or decreased since the survey date.  One of the major limitations of this data is the 
inability to track how the businesses change over time.  Perhaps some do evolve from smaller 
street vendors to larger, formal businesses.  However, with the current data there is no way to tell 
if these changes are occurring. 
Another major finding of this thesis is the importance of owning property specifically for 
formal business creation.  Households overwhelmingly buy property before they start a formal 
business.  They have extra capital before they even form their business; however, the importance 
of owning property for a business seems to be outstanding.  A future policy implication of this 
result is that one way to encourage households to register their businesses is to get them 
registered land before they start their business.  Another possibility is to offer registered land to 
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return migrants in exchange for them agreeing to start a licensed business.  Through incentives, 
return migrants may be more inclined to start licensed businesses. 
 Migrants may not be the principal drivers of development; however, they are clearly 
entrepreneurial and willing to take risks with the capital they accumulated abroad rather than 
simply living off of it as some have argued.  Similarly, community-level migration seems 
beneficial for all types of businesses, as the economic multiplier effects argued by Massey and 
Parrado (1994) seem to be a great driver of business formation. 
It remains unclear how these businesses formed by return migrants or perpetuated by the 
multiplier effects of community-wide migration were affected by the recession.  With the loss of 
substantial capital due to the decreasing flow of remittances, these businesses may be closing 
rapidly with the decrease in demand for their products.  Could the recession force numerous 
businesses to close as the flow of capital drops dramatically?  How are informal businesses 
dealing with the recession compared to larger formal businesses?  If informal businesses often 
offer lower prices than formal businesses could they be more robust to economic downturn?  
This avenue of research might be especially fertile for qualitative research to examine how large 
scale versus smaller businesses are coping with the decline in community wide remittances. I 
would anticipate that the informal sector might be more robust because they are more used to the 
fluctuations in the economy.  Furthermore, as the economy continues to improve, are new 
businesses being formed?   
Another major avenue of research is how American retail is influencing these businesses.  
As of March 31
st
 2011, there were 1,752 Wal-Marts in Mexico (Walmart 2011).  Wal-Mart is 
able to create economies of scale and often have lower prices than the surrounding businesses.   
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America has already seen how Wal-Mart can devastate urban economies, forcing small 
businesses to close.  Is the same process occurring in Mexico? Moreover, Puri and Shiavo (1999) 
documented that migrant households often have a greater preference for international goods than 
domestic ones.  Wal-Mart might be able to better accommodate for this demand, for cheaper than 
smaller informal businesses.   To make matters worse, businesses are started in communities 
with a higher prevalence of migrants, who might be more accustomed to shop at wal-mart and be 
more likely to purchase the international goods that Wal-Mart supplies.  For a follow up project 
to this thesis, I would like to get data on when Wal-Marts were added to these communities and 
see if they even discourage business formation in the first place. 
In summary, this thesis has contributed to the existing literature regarding the relationship 
between informality in Mexico and migration.  The two are related, as households use migration 
as a means of overcoming capital constraints and forming an informal business.  Similarly, this 
research has helped to differentiate which variables have led to different types of businesses 
being formed and why.  Finally, this research has helped to improve the methodology employed 
for business formation, because despite the inarguable influence of community-level factors, no 
research has used multilevel modeling techniques before. 
As with any research, this work raises more questions than answers.  I will offer three 
possible ways to extend this work.  In the future, it would be beneficial to analyze not only if 
migrants are starting businesses, but also how successful they are.  Especially with the prevalent 
community-level variables, it would be interesting to examine which community-level factors 
predict successful versus unsuccessful businesses.  Additionally, it would be interesting if an 
urban household member may migrate specifically to save a fledgling business, as rural 
households often do (Stark and Bloom 1985).  Similar multilevel event history analysis 
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techniques could be employed to different data.  Another similar avenue for future research is 
how businesses progress and grow and potentially switch between sectors over time.  Do the 
businesses shift sectors over time?  The most successful ones might grow and register becoming 
formal, while the majority might stay stagnant or fizzle out.   Once again, it would be interesting 
to examine which community-level factors propagate such movements across economic sectors.    
Another possible avenue of research would be to interview potential migrants regarding 
their economic motivations for migration.  Do they migrate specifically to accumulate enough 
capital to start a business or return with a surplus of capital and then decide a business is the 
most productive investment for their acquired capital?  This may be an area specifically for 
qualitative researchers.  Another crucial follow-up question from this thesis is the influence of 
clusters of informal businesses in communities on broader economic growth.  Are they entirely 
dependent on the multiplier effects of remittances and migration more broadly or over time, such 
that they lead the communities away from economic dependence on migration towards economic 
independence?  Finally, this would be difficult to acquire data for but it would be fascinating to 
examine the genetics of migrants and the prevalence of their risk-taking genes.  Then once that 
data would be gained, migrants who start businesses could be examined for hereditability factors 
and the kinds of businesses they form.  Are all migrants with particular advantages more 
entrepreneurial or is it a select few with risk-taking genes? 
 This thesis has contributed to the literature which has demonstrated the association 
between migration and business formation.  This research has diverged from other research by 
specifically examining the influence of migration on the informal versus formal dichotomy in 
Mexico.   Additionally, this research has implemented relatively new techniques, multilevel and 
event history to the problem of business formation.  The overall findings of thesis is that 
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migration like informality may have been a response to neoliberalism, and through migration the 
informal economy in Mexico proliferated. 
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